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INTRODUCTION
Only two years after the plurality opinion in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,1 in which Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion endorsed the very limited use of race in school
integration cases under the Fourteenth Amendment,2 the Court’s opinion in
Ricci v. DeStefano3 transplants Fourteenth Amendment colorblind tenets4 into
Title VII jurisprudence.5 Just as the Washington v. Davis intent requirement6
sets a nearly insurmountable barrier to proof in Fourteenth Amendment
discrimination cases,7 so too does the Court’s novel “strong basis in evidence”

1. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). A Louisville case, McFarland v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, was consolidated with the Seattle case. 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005).
2. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus
special talents and needs, should also be considered.”).
3. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e-17 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, sex and religion); see Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675 (noting that the Court’s equal
protection cases “can provide helpful guidance in this statutory [TitleVII] context”).
6. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding discriminatory impact, standing alone, is not enough
to establish a constitutionally cognizable Equal Protection claim).
7. See Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second
Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 242–43 (1997); Mark
Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 402–03 (1994).
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presumption set forth in Ricci.8 For under either evidentiary standard, proof
must be nearly conclusive that the discriminatory perpetrator intended to
discriminate.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, disproportionate impact is alone
insufficient to establish an equal protection claim;9 likewise, mere fear of
litigation is insufficient to sustain an employer’s assertion of voluntary
compliance with Title VII.10 Doctrinally, the Court is one short step away
from merging the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII into an
insurmountable, post-racial standard of proof in discrimination cases.11
There is a central tension in the Court’s Equal Protection and Title VII
jurisprudence between equality of opportunity and equality in results.12 The
Court’s entire body of race jurisprudence is a series of piecemeal, incremental
compromises to constitutionalize or codify “opportunity” (mere access) with
little or no regard for substance.13 Substantive equality is effectively ignored
because the Court emphasizes process values over transformative equality.14
While this was certainly true in reference to the Rehnquist Court’s race
jurisprudence, where Justice O’Connor wrote seminal opinions advocating
diversity as a process value,15 rejecting the significance of the present day

8. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675–77.
9. See generally David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935, 955 (1989) (noting that “Plessy adopted the narrowest possible interpretation of
the Reconstruction understanding, and Washington v Davis adopted the narrowest plausible
interpretation of Brown”); Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness,
Frederick Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823, 845 n.100
(2008) (“In reverse discrimination cases, that is, cases where the claim is centered on a burden on
white interests, the Washington v. Davis intent requirement is conspicuously absent—
disproportionate impact is enough.”). This means that reverse discrimination claims are
privileged by the Court, while claims advanced by people of color are uniformly rejected because
either there is no “proof” of discrimination or the burden on white interests cannot be justified in
a race-neutral manner. See Powell, supra, at 845 n.100; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The
Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW &
INEQ. 1, 30 (2005) (“While whites and men who challenge remedial usages of gender and race
receive heightened judicial scrutiny of their discrimination claims, women and persons of color
who seek judicial solicitude, but who lack proof of specific intent, or the elusive ‘smoking gun,’
only receive rational basis review.” (footnotes omitted)).
10. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
11. See id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“But the war between disparate impact and equal
protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on
what terms—to make peace between them.”).
12. Cedric Merlin Powell, Hopwood: Bakke II and Skeptical Scrutiny, 9 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 811, 857 (1999).
13. Id. at 933.
14. Id. at 859.
15. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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effects of past discrimination16 and systemic societal discrimination, the
Roberts Court has gone even farther in promoting this contrived “choice”
between race neutral opportunity and race-conscious results.
Justice
O’Connor’s opinions at least acknowledge race, although in decidedly narrow
terms.17 There has been a marked doctrinal shift with Justice O’Connor’s
retirement and the ascendance of the Roberts Court. While the Court has never
been enthusiastic about race-conscious remedial approaches to eradicate
inequality, the Roberts Court has advanced a neutral approach rooted in liberal
individualism and post-racialism.
Parents Involved and Ricci graphically illustrate this shift. These decisions
start from the premise that discrimination no longer exists, or, if it does, it must
be identified with exacting particularity.18 For example, in Parents Involved,
since the City of Louisville had been released from a consent decree in 2000,19
and Seattle never had a history of de jure segregated schools,20 the Court held
that both school assignment plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
colorblind mandate because race was purportedly a predominant factor in
school assignment decisions.21 Since there were no state-mandated segregated
school systems in Louisville and Seattle, race-conscious remedies were
constitutionally suspect.22 Diversity cannot be pursued at the cost of individual
choice to attend neighborhood schools. This is essentially the tenet that the
Constitution guarantees equal opportunity, not equal results. This fits squarely
within liberal individualism—opportunity is available to all individuals, and
the Constitution protects individuals, not racial groups. This blindly optimistic
view obscures the present day effects of past discrimination. It also displaces

16. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270, 284 (1986) (invalidating
a race-based layoff system agreed upon by the Jackson, Michigan Board of Education and the
teacher’s union and ignoring the fact that African-American teachers in the system were
consistently the last hired and first fired); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
498–500 (1989) (concluding that amorphous societal discrimination is not constitutionally
actionable and applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a minority business enterprise program);
Adarand Constuctors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 204–10, 227 (1995) (invalidating a federal
disadvantaged business enterprise program and concluding that strict scrutiny applied to local,
state, and federal race-conscious initiatives).
17. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (“Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental
action under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
18. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007);
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009).
19. 551 U.S. at 715–16.
20. Id. at 712.
21. Id. at 782 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
22. Id. at 748.
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valid political decisions made by the community to embrace diversity and
substantive equality.23
In Ricci, the Court constructed, out of whole cloth, a new evidentiary
standard for Title VII cases: there must be a strong basis in evidence that a
disparate impact claim will be initiated against a public employer seeking to
avoid such liability by decertifying the results of a promotion test for
firefighters.24 The Court concluded that the city engaged in disparate treatment
(intentional discrimination) of the white and Latino firefighters who expected
to be promoted based on the results of the exam.25 The fact that the exam
disproportionately impacted African-American firefighters 26 was irrelevant to
the Court because the Constitution (and by extension Title VII) does not
guarantee equal results.27 Instead, the Court viewed the city’s efforts to avoid

23. Professor Spann explains that:
There is no credible argument that either the text or the original intent of the Constitution
requires the Supreme Court to invalidate integration programs that are voluntarily adopted
by politically accountable, white majoritarian, government policymaking officials. And
as a matter of relative institutional competence, there is simply no reason whatsoever to
believe that an institution with the racial track record of the Supreme Court is better able
than a legislature or school board to decide whether primary and secondary school
integration is in the best interests of a pluralistic, multicultural society.
Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 628 (2008) (emphasis
added). In this sense, the very legitimacy of the Court’s decision in Parents Involved can be
questioned. See id. at 623–27. It should be noted that there are times when the legislature itself is
ill-suited to deal with the problems underlying school integration. Recently, a bill was introduced
in the Kentucky Senate, captioned Senate Bill 3 (“SB 3”), which was an attempt to displace the
current school student assignment plan with a neighborhood schools policy. See Stephanie
Steitzer, Senate OKs Local-School Bill, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 8, 2011, at A1;
Stephanie Steitzer, Senate Schools Plan Likely Dead, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 12, 2011,
at A1; Mike Wynn, Senate Votes Against Busing, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 21, 2012, at
A1.
24. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
25. Id. at 2664–65, 2681.
26. Id. at 2667. Out of seventy-seven candidates for promotion to lieutenant in the fire
department, only six blacks passed the eligibility exam. Id. at 2666. These candidates were not,
however, eligible for immediate promotion; there was an internal rule that determined the order of
promotions. Id. Ten candidates were eligible for immediate promotion—they were all white. Id.
Forty-one candidates took the exam for promotion to captain, only three black candidates passed.
Id. Again, these three candidates were not eligible for immediate promotion. Id. Seven white
candidates and two Hispanic candidates were eligible for immediate promotion. Id. So, in a very
real sense, no African-American firefighter actually “passed” the exam in order to be eligible for
promotion. See id.
27. The narrative framework of “equal opportunity” versus “equal results” fits squarely
within the Court’s post-racial jurisprudence. Since the process is essentially open and fair, any
use of race is suspect. So, racial disparity that negatively impacts African-Americans is “natural,”
and any burden on white privilege and settled entitlements is constitutionally suspect or a
violation of Title VII. As Professors Cheryl I. Harris and Kimberly West-Faulcon note:
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disparate impact liability as pure racial politics.28 The Roberts Court is off
course.
This Article advances a critique of these cases in particular, and more
broadly, the concept of equality of opportunity versus equality in results.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, disproportionate impact alone is
insufficient to advance an equal protection claim—there must be
discriminatory intent by a state actor.29 Conversely, under Title VII, a
cognizable claim can be advanced under a disparate impact theory against a
private or public actor.30 There is an unresolved issue in Ricci: whether the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII should be interpreted to require
discriminatory intent, thereby providing “symmetry” to equal protection and
Title VII jurisprudence. Should the Washington v. Davis discriminatory intent
standard be transplanted into the Court’s Title VII jurisprudence? This Article
answers this question with an emphatic “No.” In fact, the Court’s equal
protection and Title VII jurisprudence should be reconceptualized so that
disproportionate impact may serve as presumptive evidence of discriminatory
intent. This moves the analysis away from an outcome-determinative
assumption that discrimination is natural and neutral to a critical assessment of
how structural inequality functions in society. The contrived dichotomy
between equal opportunity and equal results should be rejected. By
segmenting “equality” into the false choice of “opportunity” or “result,” the
current discussion is skewed toward liberal individualism and neutrality. The
significance of race is obscured.

Arguably, even before Ricci, modern antidiscrimination law’s central narrative was that
potential changes to the racial status quo in the workplace, in business, and in schools and
universities, threatened and compromised the rights and legitimate expectations of whites
as a group. Over the long colorblind march of the past two decades, the Court has
embraced the view—albeit by a bare five-vote majority—that racially attentive actions or
public policy are inherently suspect, no matter the motive. This doctrinal move has
effectively constrained the operation of antidiscrimination law and remedies—indeed
turning the remedies into racial injuries and further legitimizing a narrative in which
whites are (or are at risk of being) repeatedly victimized because of their race. . . . [T]he
underlying racial frame is that present-day discrimination is largely a problem confronting
whites.
Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing
Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 81–82 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
28. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684 (Alito, J., concurring) (rejecting the City of New Haven’s
rationale that it voluntarily complied with Title VII by decertifying the exam because of its
disproportionate impact on African-American firefighters, and concluding that this rationale was
merely a “pretext” for the City’s real reason: “the desire to placate a politically important racial
constituency”).
29. See id. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2672–73 (majority opinion).
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This Article rejects neutrality and argues that the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VII should embrace transformative equality and an interpretive
analysis that seeks to eradicate the present day effects of past discrimination.
True symmetry between the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII means that
the constitutional and statutory mandates of equality reinforce each other.31
Ironically, the Court’s race jurisprudence is a paradigmatic example of
disparate impact discrimination: while it may not be intentionally
discriminatory (this itself is debatable), it certainly disproportionately impacts
people of color in a negative way.32 There is nothing neutral about this:
The essence of this postracial form of discrimination would entail the
transformation of a conventional discrimination claim asserted by racial
minorities into a claim of reverse discrimination asserted by whites. That
transformation could be achieved by stressing the absence of any legally
cognizable basis for providing remedial resources to the original minority
claimants, in order to free up those resource [sic] for allocation to worthier
whites. The technique would entail more than just the time-honored practice
of evading a discrimination claim by blaming the victims. It would recast the
minority victims as shameless perpetrators of discrimination, with all of the
negative connotations that an indictment of unlawful discrimination conveys.
It turns out that this postracial discrimination strategy is far from merely
hypothetical. Its proponents include a majority of the current Justices on the
United States Supreme Court. The Roberts Court, despite its relative youth,
has already issued a number of decisions that employ the technique of
postracial discrimination to elevate the interests of whites over the interests of
racial minorities. The most revealing is its 2009 decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano, where a divided Court required the City of New Haven to utilize
the results of a firefighter promotion exam that benefitted whites, even though
the exam had a racially-disparate impact that adversely affected Latinos and
blacks.
The majority opinion depicted historically advantaged white
firefighters as the victims of unlawful discrimination, while depicting
historically disadvantaged minority firefighters as the politically powerful
perpetrators of invidious discrimination. The governing legal doctrines hardly
compelled the Court’s result, or the Court’s inversion of the customary
33
categories of perpetrator and victim.

As Professor Spann points out in eloquent detail, what is particularly
devastating about the Court’s brand of post-racialism is that everything is

31. See Powell, supra note 12, at 922–32.
32. See Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1595,1610–11 (1989) [hereinafter Xerces]; see also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 109–126 (1992) (discussing shifting rules of racial
standing that perpetuate a caste based system of racial oppression).
33. Girardeau A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, MOD. AM., Fall 2009, at 26 (footnote
omitted).
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turned inside out—”the oppressed become the oppressor;”34 doctrinal
standards are inverted so that disparate impact claims morph into reverse
disparate treatment claims, while voluntary attempts at eradicating the present
day effects of past discrimination are rejected as race-based decision-making.
The neutral rhetoric employed by the Court, including the rationale that the
Constitution (or Title VII) guarantees equal opportunity, not equal results,
serves to preserve systemic oppression.35 The Court constitutionalized liberal
individualism in a series of decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment.36
Now, the Court is attempting to codify that same principle under Title VII by
transplanting Fourteenth Amendment principles into its Title VII
jurisprudence:
The Supreme Court now appears to be forcing Title VII into the doctrinal
regime that it has used to neutralize affirmative action. Since the conservative
bloc majority took control of the Supreme Court, the Court has invalidated
every constitutional affirmative action program that it has considered on the
merits, with only one exception. . . . Justice O’Connor has now been replaced
on the Supreme Court by Justice Alito. Justice Alito’s vote to invalidate the
voluntary school integration plans that the Roberts Court held unconstitutional
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1
suggests that Justice Alito is unlikely to vote in favor of affirmative action
programs for racial minorities. Accordingly, it now seems likely that the fate
of disparate impact claims under Title VII will replicate the fate of affirmative
37
action under the Court’s conservative bloc jurisprudence.

34. Powell, supra note 7, at 199–220.
35. See id. at 214–220.
36. Powell, supra note 9, at 861 (“Justice O’Connor incorporates race into her colorblind
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, but only if it does not substantively impact white
interests and can be explained in a broader context as a benefit to all. This is interest
convergence.” (citing Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the
Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform 149–55 (2004))). This strand of liberal individualism is a
central theme in the Court’s race jurisprudence. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Co. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 204–10, 227 (1995) (invalidating a federal disadvantaged business enterprise program,
which used race as a factor in the distribution of contracts, concluding that strict scrutiny applied
to local, state, and federal race-conscious initiatives); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 476, 505 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a minority business enterprise
program enacted by the City of Richmond based upon a federal program previously held to pass
constitutional muster); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270, 284 (1986)
(invalidating a race-based layoff system designed to prevent minority school teachers from being
the last hired and first fired agreed upon by the Jackson, Michigan Board of Education and the
teacher’s union); see also Powell, supra note 9, at 859–73.
37. Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1148 (2010) (footnotes
omitted).
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Justice Scalia clearly signals this in his Ricci concurrence.38 It is
particularly noteworthy that there are no citations to Title VII decisions in
Justice Scalia’s concurrence; the doctrinal shift has already occurred:
But if the Federal Government is prohibited from discriminating on the basis
of race, Bolling v. Sharpe, then surely it is also prohibited from enacting laws
mandating that third parties—e.g., employers, whether private, State, or
municipal—discriminate on the basis of race. See Buchanan v. Warley. As
the facts of these cases illustrate, Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place
a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those
racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains,
discriminatory. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney.
....
. . . “[T]he Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Miller v. Johnson.
And of course the purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact
39
provisions cannot save the statute. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena.

Ostensibly, the Court postponed the resolution of the issue above; yet, it
appears that the only thing missing from the Court’s post-racial opinion is the
holding that the use of race, under the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII, will
be held unconstitutional or a violation of Title VII in the absence of intentional
discrimination.40 Thus, post-racialism means that reverse discrimination
claims have an inherent validity, while claims of minorities will be viewed
skeptically and subjected to unattainable levels of evidentiary proof.41 Racial
discrimination against minorities seemingly no longer exists, but reverse
discrimination claims are readily cognizable under the guise of liberal
individualism.
What is striking, indeed startling, is the manner in which Justice Scalia
frames the issue—the conclusion the next time the issue comes before the
Court is virtually assured—race skews any semblance of “fairness” and will be
viewed as presumptively discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment or
Title VII.42

38. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. See generally Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1341, 1342–43 (2010) [hereinafter Future of Disparate Impact]; Richard Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 493–94 (2003)
[hereinafter Equal Protection].
41. See Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 40, at 1342–43, 1353; Equal Protection,
supra note 40, at 520–21.
42. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 1282 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Both Parents Involved and Ricci are process-based,43 post-racial decisions
rooted in neutrality. Since equal opportunity is open to everyone in the wellfunctioning polity, then individual success becomes a group-based trope for
racial success:
Postracial discrimination is discrimination against racial minorities that
purports to be merely a ban on discrimination against whites. It is premised on
the belief that active discrimination against racial minorities has largely ceased
to exist, and that the lingering effects of past discrimination have now largely
dissipated. As a result, a prospective commitment to colorblind race neutrality
is now sufficient to promote racial equality, and any deviation from such
neutrality will itself constitute unlawful discrimination. . . . [T]he claim that we
now live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility from the
success of prominent racial minorities in roles that were traditionally reserved
for whites. Those successes have ranged from the golfing achievements of
mixed-race Tiger Woods in a traditionally white game, to the selection of
black politician Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party, to the election
44
of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.

The Court has expanded this notion of post-racial liberal individualism in
the Parents Involved and Ricci decisions.
The Court’s colorblind
constitutionalism has transformed into post-racialism.45 What is striking about
both decisions is how they ignore history, define discrimination in narrow
post-racial terms, and employ neutral rhetoric to legitimize subordination:46
The Supreme Court has played its part in this form of postracial discrimination
by inverting the traditional concepts of perpetrators and victims in a way that
allows the Court ultimately to invert the concepts of discrimination and

43. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 14 (1980). “The Process Theory, or representation-reinforcement rationale, does not
address the present day effects of past discrimination—there is no substantive conception of
equality because the Process Theory’s primary focus is on those ‘rare’ process malfunctions that
impede access to the political process.” Powell, supra note 9, at 827 n.15. This is a corollary to
the doctrinal theory that the Constitution protects equal opportunity (or access to the process), not
equal results (or race-conscious decisions targeted to address the present day effects of past
discrimination). Indeed, there is no past discrimination under the Process Theory because it is
inherently forward-looking.
44. Spann, supra note 33, at 39 (footnotes omitted).
45. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1593 (2009) (discussing postracialism as an ideology that is even more pernicious than colorblind constitutionalism because
(i) it “obscures the centrality of race and racism in society;” (ii) it encourages a retreat from raceconscious remedial approaches because society has “transcended” race; (iii) it privileges liberal
individualism to refute any claims about the lingering effects of centuries of racial oppression;
and (iv) it “denigrates collective Black political organization”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 923 (2009) (discussing the rhetorical power of
neutral narratives designed to displace any meaningful efforts at dismantling racial
discrimination).
46. Powell, supra note 9, at 858–59.
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equality themselves.
Ricci serves as an example of such postracial
discrimination, and other postracial discrimination decisions handed down by
the Roberts Court belie any suggestion that Ricci was merely an aberration.
Moreover, the Roberts Court’s postracial discrimination decisions are
reminiscent of historical Supreme Court decisions that were issued when the
Court was openly hostile to minority rights, thereby further calling the
47
legitimacy of those Roberts Court decisions into question.

The Court’s post-racial jurisprudence, as evinced in Parents Involved and
Ricci, is hostile to minority rights, but the rhetoric of the decisions is neutral.48
Unpacking this contrived neutrality, this Article advances a critique of the
Court’s race jurisprudence by analyzing Brown v. Board of Education and its
progeny as decisions about process (equal opportunity) and substance
(results),49 connecting these doctrinal themes in Justice O’Connor’s race
decisions to the inevitable post-racial decision in Parents Involved, and
interpreting the doctrinal bridge that the Court constructs between its
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII jurisprudence.
The Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII complement each other50 and should be construed as
embracing substantive, voluntary race-conscious remedial approaches designed
to eradicate systemic (structural) inequality.
It is striking how similar the Court’s approach to race is in Parents
Involved and Ricci—the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII are merged in
the Court’s post-racial analysis so that:
1) Voluntary efforts by the political community or the state to use raceconscious remedial approaches are rejected outright as intentional
51
discrimination against innocent whites;
52

2) Formal equality is employed so that individual rights trump a group
53
rights approach to substantive equality;
54

3) Colorblindness, as a normative principle, is replaced by post-racialism so
that race can never be used unless there is an identifiable state action (or a

47. Spann, supra note 33, at 39.
48. See infra Section I.
49. See infra Section II.
50. Powell, supra note 12, at 922–32.
51. See Spann, supra note 23, at 627–28; Spann, supra note 33, at 45 (“In cases ranging
from firefighter promotions to school resegregation, the Court seems to care very little about the
interests of racial minorities—and very much about the interests of the white majority.”).
52. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
38 (1991) (developing the theory of formal race unconnectedness where race is neutral and
unconnected to history or context, and arguing that racism is an aberrational defect of the process
and any use of race is inherently unconstitutional when it impacts innocent whites); Powell, supra
note 7, at 210–14.
53. Powell, supra note 12, at 933.
54. See Cho, supra note 45, at 1593.
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55

diversity interest in post-secondary education) under the Fourteenth
56
Amendment or a “strong basis in evidence” under Title VII; and
4) Neutrality is foregrounded so that there is an emphasis on equal
57
opportunity for whites, not the eradication of the present day effects of
past discrimination.

To develop and critique these themes, this Article advances several
arguments. Section I explores the neutral rhetoric of equal opportunity and
equal results. Since the Court borrows from its Fourteenth Amendment
decisions to fashion the “strong basis in evidence” standard in Title VII cases,
it is instructive to analyze the Court’s process-based neutrality.58 Section II
builds upon this theme by exploring how the school cases ultimately lead to a
post-racial decision like Ricci. It is no doctrinal accident that, only two years
after its decision in Parents Involved, which radically redefined Brown (the
font of the Fourteenth Amendment), the Court then transplanted its newly
minted post-racialism into its Title VII jurisprudence.59 The Court expanded
Davis to encompass voluntary remedial efforts to eradicate existing systems of
caste in the public and private workplace.60
Section III critiques Ricci as a doctrinally flawed opinion that disregards
the legislative history and meaning of Title VII, inverts the meaning of
disparate impact so that now it means disparate treatment of whites whose
reverse discrimination suits are more valid than the illusory claims of displaced
minorities, and establishes a new evidentiary presumption (“strong basis in
evidence”) without articulating an analytical framework to evaluate
prospective claims. Section III concludes with an argument for substantive
equality, an approach that rejects the narrow conception of discrimination
employed by the Court in Parents Involved and Ricci, and instead focuses on
the eradication of structural inequality through doctrinal principles rooted in
the anti-subordination and anti-caste principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment.

55. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003).
56. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (“We conclude that race-based action
like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a
strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the
disparate-impact statute.”).
57. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 102 (“Ricci reconfigures and ultimately
whitens discrimination, effectively privileging whites as a racial group. Ricci furthers this larger
project in multiple ways: It suppresses racial attentiveness; it skews the concept of racial
neutrality; it privileges disparate treatment claims over disparate impact claims; it treats disparate
impact as a form of affirmative action and repositions whites as racially disempowered
protagonists in the struggle for civil rights.” (footnote omitted)).
58. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675.
59. See id. at 2673.
60. See id. at 2677.
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I. THE NEUTRAL RHETORIC OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND RESULTS
It should be clear that whether discrimination “exists” or not is a product of
how the Court chooses to define it.61 This brings us to the underlying
“tension” between equal opportunity and equal results. This is a largely
manufactured tension because the Court disregards history, context, and the
present day effects of past discrimination to construct a neutral rationale for
inequality. Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw describes what she refers
to as the restrictive view of equal opportunity:
The restrictive vision, which exists side by side with this expansive view,
treats equality as a process, downplaying the significance of actual outcomes.
The primary objective of antidiscrimination law, according to this vision, is to
prevent future wrongdoing rather than to redress present manifestations of past
injustice. “Wrongdoing,” moreover, is seen primarily as isolated actions
against individuals rather than as a social policy against an entire group. Nor
does the restrictive view contemplate the courts’ playing a role in redressing
harms from America’s racist past as opposed to merely policing society in
order to eliminate a narrow set of proscribed discrimination practices.
Moreover, even when injustice is found, efforts to redress it must be balanced
against and limited by competing interests of white workers—even when those
interests were actually created by the subordination of blacks. The innocence
of whites weighs more heavily than do either the past wrongs committed upon
blacks or the benefits that whites derived from those wrongs. In sum, the
restrictive view seeks to proscribe only certain kinds of subordinating acts, and
62
then only when other interests are not overly burdened.

Parents Involved and Ricci fit squarely within the restrictive, process view
of equality. Parents Involved re-conceptualizes Brown as a process-based
decision that permits reverse discrimination suits whenever individual school
choice is burdened.63 This doctrinal move is much more sinister than a
colorblind approach that, at minimum, seeks to rationalize a neutral outcome
where race may be used in limited instances.64 Parents Involved marks a
seminal shift to post-racial jurisprudence: “The way to stop discrimination on

61. See Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a Color
Blind Society, 36 AKRON L. REV. 693, 709–11 (2003).
62. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimization in Anti-Discrimination Law, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that
Formed the Movement 103, 105 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis added).
63. See 551 U.S. 701, 746–48 (2007) (plurality opinion).
64. See id. at 788–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“If
school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere
with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are
free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without
treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by
race.”).
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the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”65 Likewise, in
Ricci, the Court disregards its own precedent, the legislative history of Title
VII, and fundamental principles of Evidence to craft a novel “strong basis in
evidence” standard66 that privileges process over true equality.67
The theory advanced here advocates a substantive and expansive
interpretation of equal opportunity, one that is inclusive and highly skeptical of
process.68 In other words, results are not presumptively legitimate if they flow
from a narrow set of process-based opportunities:
Part of the intuitive appeal of this conception of “equality of opportunity, not
equality of result” stems from the analogy that can be drawn to a game. If a
game is well designed and its rules are enforced, each of the competitors can
be said to have an equal opportunity to win even though some will have more
of the requisite abilities. To insist that the results be equalized to compensate
for differences in ability among the competitors would be inconsistent with the
69
whole idea of playing the game.

But what if the game is slanted toward the preservation of existing systems of
caste-based oppression? The answer should be that we have to change the
game:
The problem, therefore, is that the definition of “discrimination” has been
narrowed and broadened to denote the intentional use of race no matter the

65. Id. at 748 (plurality opinion).
66. See 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that context matters
and that, given the long and pervasive history against minority firefighters, the white firefighters
“had no vested right to promotion”); Spann, supra note 37, at 1145–46 (“[I]n 1991 Congress
actually codified [Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 429–32 (1971) (endorsing disparate
impact claims)] in the Title VII amendments that it adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1991—a statute that was enacted to overrule certain post-Griggs Supreme Court discrimination
decisions that Congress viewed as insufficiently protective of racial minorities. Despite Griggs
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Roberts Court has now chosen to launch an attack on Title
VII disparate impact claims—an attack that is difficult to understand in a non-invidious way.”
(footnote omitted)). From the standpoint of the law of Evidence, the “strong basis in evidence”
standard lacks an interpretive principle and analytical framework. Specifically, it is unclear
whether the standard is simply an inference or a full-blown presumption and how the burden of
proof will be allocated once it is established that there is a strong basis in evidence to believe that
an employer will be subject to a disparate impact suit. There is no consideration of any of these
fundamental concerns in the Ricci opinion itself.
67. See Spann, supra note 37, at 1154 (“Because whites outperformed minorities on the
exam, the exam must have been measuring qualities that were relevant to merit-based promotions.
Therefore, any decision not to certify the results of that exam must have been rooted in a desire to
abandon merit in favor of unwarranted racial affirmative action.”).
68. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615, 697–98.
69. David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality
of Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171, 181–82 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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context. This means that neutral policies and practices having a disparate
impact on women and persons of color will be ignored as unimportant and that
affirmative remedial measures based on historical context will be labeled
“discrimination” and banned. “Discrimination” must be redefined to combat
this tendency. The definition of “discrimination” must include neutral
structures and processes that create a disparate impact on persons who have
suffered discrimination historically; it should also include behaviors that harm
70
protected groups as a result of unconscious discrimination.

Given the current state of the Court’s race jurisprudence, it is not an
exaggeration to say that we are in a new era of racial denial made easier by the
passage of time and a series of incremental victories and one historic
moment—the election of President Barack H. Obama:
It is true that the President of the United States is now black, but that does not
mean that the society that elected him has become postracial. One could
choose to characterize Obama’s election in different ways. One could
characterize it as demonstrating that minorities can now compete on a level
playing field, without the need for affirmative action or serious
antidiscrimination measures. Alternatively, one could characterize Obama’s
election as demonstrating only that a mixed-race, multiple Ivy League
graduate, with the intellectual and political skills to become President of the
Harvard Law Review can successfully navigate contemporary racial culture—
thereby providing little evidence of how less-exceptional racial minority group
members are likely to fare on a playing field that is far from level. As
Professor Darren Hutchinson has noted, the “postracial” claim may simply
illustrate the phenomenon of “racial exhaustion.” Whites have simply grown
tired of having to deal with the discrimination claims asserted by racial
minorities. As a result of this fatigue, whites may now have decided to assert
71
retaliatory discrimination claims of their own.

In this vein, Parents Involved and Ricci are preemptive strikes against equality
in the name of white privilege.72 In Parents Involved, the individual school
choice preferences of white students are privileged over the substantive
integrative goals voluntarily embraced by the community;73 likewise, in Ricci,
the purported “merit” of the firefighter promotion exams is used to rationalize
years of exclusion from the officer ranks of African-American firefighters.74
70. Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 456 (2010).
71. Spann, supra note 33, at 41 (footnote omitted).
72. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
73. See Spann, supra note 23, at 623–30 (discussing the Court’s use of raw political power
to undermine valid, locally based political decisions to embrace integration rather than the
Court’s cynical decision to constitutionalize de facto resegregation).
74. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Firefighting is a profession in
which the legacy of racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow.”); see also Harris &
West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 157–65 (discussing the inherent flaws in the firefighter
promotion test to illustrate the error of presuming the validity of promotion tests that
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This is why the rhetorical allure of “equal opportunity, not equal results”75 is
so profound and formalistically narrow. In the midst of this epochal change in
race relations, there remain persistent and lingering present day effects of past
discrimination. Structural inequality exists, and it persists.76
The Court’s post-racial jurisprudence preserves structural inequality under
the guise of neutrality. Similarly situated individuals should not be
differentiated on the basis of race, and equal opportunity (or equal treatment)77
is the touchstone of the Court’s post-racial jurisprudence. Process is valued
over the eradication of caste and substantive rights.78 This process-based,
market approach to substantive equality should be rejected—the marketplace
model of equal protection where the process is open and individuals “compete”
for goods and substantive rights is antithetical to the mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It ignores the core purpose of the amendment—the eradication
of race-based oppression.79
Parents Involved and Ricci are process-based equal protection and Title
VII cases.80 The central premise underlying both decisions is that the process

disproportionately impact people of color and noting how decisions like Parents Involved and
Ricci replicate systemic inequality).
75. See John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 314 (1994).
76. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM.
SOC. REV. 465 (1996); Symposium, Structural Racism, POVERTY & RACE, Nov./Dec. 2006;
Note, “Trading Action for Access”: The Myth of Meritocracy and the Failure to Remedy
Structural Discrimination, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2156 (2008) (examining structural inequalities that
displace people of color and women, and critiquing neutral, process-based explanations for
disparities).
77. Professor Cheryl I. Harris explains that:
Actual differences between the races are beyond the reach of the law unless there is
evidence they were intentionally and maliciously produced, or the argument runs they are
not real or relevant differences. Thus, Equal Protection means only equal treatment.
When equal treatment defines equal protection, not only are subordinated groups
foreclosed from exercising effective legal remedies, but the law functions to actually
promote and entrench subordination.
Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1753, 1757 (2001); ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 4 (2009) (rejecting
the anti-differentiation principle by noting that “where it can be shown that blacks and whites are
not similarly situated in society because of historical forces, blacks must be treated differently if
they are to be accorded equal opportunity, or similar treatment”).
78. See Crenshaw, supra note 62, at 105–06.
79. See Powell, supra note 7, at 226–29; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
338–40 (1993) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment is an anti-caste principle, not an antidifferentiation principle); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (noting that the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment acknowledges the amendment as a race-conscious remedial approach to the
eradication of caste).
80. Powell, supra note 9, at 841–42.
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is open (or should be) and that the Constitution or Title VII protects
individuals, not racial groups, and equal process, not equal results. Justice
Kennedy is a pivotal figure in the articulation of the rhetorically neutral theme
of equal opportunity. Indeed, his concurrence in Parents Involved81 and his
opinion for the Court in Ricci82 track the doctrinal parameters of the Court’s
new conception of equality. While Justice Kennedy embraces neutrality in
both decisions, he adopts two distinct views about how the process functions.83
In Parents Involved, he eschews Chief Justice Roberts’ post-racial
constitutionalism and adopts an approach that acknowledges that race can be
used holistically so that school systems do not have to accept resegregation as
a “natural” occurrence.84 Parents Involved is all about equal educational
opportunity in the process. While Justice Kennedy agrees that the Constitution
protects individuals, not groups,85 he is more concerned that an individualized
right to school choice will lead inevitably to resegregation.86 Thus, he is
willing to permit the limited use of race after other race neutral alternatives
prove ineffective. 87 This is a rare process malfunction to Justice Kennedy, so
the use of race is appropriate in this limited circumstance.88 Brown cannot be
81. 551 U.S. 701, 782–98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
82. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–81 (2009).
83. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
84. 551 U.S. at 783, 788–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution
requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot
endorse that conclusion.”); id. at 788–89 (“If school authorities are concerned that the studentbody compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the
problem in a general way . . . .”).
85. Id. at 795 (emphasizing the analytical significance of the de jure-de facto distinction to
determine whether race-conscious remedies are permissible, and stating that “[r]eduction of an
individual to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment is among the most pernicious
actions our government can undertake”).
86. Id. at 797 (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation . . . .”).
87. Id. at 798 (“Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors,
plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. . . . [M]easures other than differential
treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be exhausted.”); id. at 789–90.
88. See ELY, supra note 43, at 136 (“To the extent that there is a stoppage, the system is
malfunctioning, and the Court should unblock it without caring how it got that way.”). Under this
process-oriented view of polity, courts should serve as referees to the process and only intervene
when there is a significant stoppage of access and meaningful participation. Id. at 101–03.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is squarely within this canon: racial isolation and resegregation
are blockages to the process that serve to undermine its proper functioning. Thus, “[a]
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its
discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling
interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of that diversity
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interpreted so formalistically that any consideration of race becomes
unconstitutional.
It would be erroneous and overly optimistic to conclude that Justice
Kennedy embraces a substantive view of equality. He does not jettison liberal
individualism—his concurrence is an attempt to reconcile Brown’s anti-caste
principle with the plurality’s post-racial anti-differentiation principle—neutral
alternatives come before any consideration of race.89 However, race can be
used, in limited circumstances, to promote equal opportunity in the process of
assigning schools based on the expressed preferences of students and their
parents. There is a more generalized benefit to society as a whole in the form
of diversity, so “a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a
diverse student population.”90 Diversity is more of a process value than an
affirmation of substantive equality;91 indeed, Justice Kennedy’s reliance on
this concept graphically illustrates the bright-line drawn between equal
opportunity (process) and results (substance).
There is at least an implicit concern with disparate impact in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence. He notes emphatically that state and local authorities
do not have to accept the “status quo of racial isolation in schools,” and that de
facto resegregation should not be ignored.92 So, there is at least some
skepticism that structural disparities are natural: Justice Kennedy does not
embrace Justice Thomas’ explanation that de facto resegregation is solely the
result of “innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices.”93
Racial imbalance means something, particularly in analyzing access to the
process. However, when there is no intentional discrimination by the state
itself, the de jure-de facto distinction means that “[t]he state must seek
alternatives to the classification and differential treatment of individuals by
race, at least absent some extraordinary showing not present here.”94 To
Justice Kennedy, there was no showing that the school boards considered raceneutral alternatives.95 As a result, race predominated in the school assignment
decision-making process.96 There was no equal opportunity because the state
tried to use “crude racial categories” to guarantee a specific racial percentage

. . . .” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
89. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
90. Id. at 797–98.
91. Powell, supra note 12, at 905–06; Powell, supra note 9, at 873–79.
92. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
93. Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95. Id. at 789.
96. Id. at 786–87.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

HARVESTING NEW CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY

273

(result) in the schools.97 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s analytical approach in
Parents Involved is rooted in the notion of a neutral process where race should
be considered only in the rare instance where neutral alternatives fail. This is
in line with the conception that the Constitution protects equal opportunity, not
equal results.98
Justice Kennedy’s conception of race is much more literal and formalistic
in Ricci.99 Conversely, Ricci is all about equal results—a neutral result cannot
be disturbed to guarantee a preferred racial outcome.100 Disparate impact—the
fact that no African-American firefighter passed the promotion examination—
is irrelevant because every eligible firefighter had an opportunity to pass the
examination.101 There is no reference to racial isolation in the officer corps of
firefighters, no acknowledgement of a history of exclusion with present day
effects, and no mention of diversity in the employment ranks of firefighters in
general.102 There is no broader community benefit here. Justice Kennedy
imports equal protection principles into the Court’s Title VII jurisprudence and
constructs a new strand of liberal individualism under the statute.103
Ironically, intent becomes a prerequisite to advancing a successful defense
to a reverse discrimination (disparate treatment) charge.104 The irony rests in
the fact that Title VII explicitly recognizes impact as statutorily cognizable
without any evidence of intent.105 Justice Kennedy’s opinion changes this:
“[U]nder Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional
discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an
unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in
evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to

97. Id.
98. See Morrison, supra note 75, at 314.
99. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2666 (2009).
100. Id. at 2675 (“Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition based on
a mere good-faith fear of disparate- impact liability would encourage race-based action at the
slightest hint of disparate impact. . . . That would amount to a de facto quota system, in which a
‘focus on statistics . . . could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic
measures.’ Even worse, an employer could discard test results . . . with the intent of obtaining the
employer’s preferred racial balance.” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 992 (1988))).
101. Id. at 2678.
102. Id. at 2689–2710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “In 1972, Congress extended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to cover public employment. At that time, municipal fire
departments across the country, including New Haven’s, pervasively discriminated against
minorities. . . . It took decades of persistent effort, advanced by Title VII litigation, to open
firefighting posts to members of racial minorities.” Id. at 2690.
103. See id. at 2681.
104. See infra Section III.A.3.
105. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”).
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take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”106 Disparate impact is
unintentional and cannot be remedied in the absence of a strong basis in
evidence,107 a Fourteenth Amendment standard, for doing so. De facto
resegregation is remediable in Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved
concurrence108 while de facto disparate impact is irremediable in his Ricci
opinion.109 This is the core distinction between process and results.
Under Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, Parents Involved is about equal access
(opportunity) to the process.110 Since racial isolation threatens the enduring
mandate of Brown and an open process, Justice Kennedy is unwilling to adopt
the Roberts Court’s post-racial constitutionalism.111 By contrast, Ricci is about
racial results (who is entitled to “win” between competing disparate treatment
and potential disparate impact claims),112 so Justice Kennedy presumes that the
reverse discrimination claim of the white firefighters is valid, and virtually
ignores the well-established disparate impact claim of the African-American
firefighters.113 Parents Involved and Ricci lack a substantive conception of
equality. Doctrinally, this can be traced from the school decisions, to Parents
Involved, and to Ricci itself.
II. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS PROGENY: PROCESS AND
SUBSTANCE
There is a doctrinal link between the Court’s school race decisions and its
Title VII race jurisprudence—the school cases constitutionalize the processbased proposition that the Constitution protects equal opportunity, not equal
results,114 while the Court’s Title VII jurisprudence codifies the same

106. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
107. This is akin to the rationale that societal discrimination is too amorphous to remedy.
See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731–32 (2007) (plurality opinion); Ricci, 129 S. Ct.
at 2675.
108. 551 U.S. at 788–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
109. 129 S. Ct. at 2675, 2678.
110. 551 U.S. at 788–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
111. Id. at 787–88 (“The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”).
112. 129 S. Ct. at 2664, 2673 (“Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions
would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.”).
113. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (noting the “frustrating duality” of the Equal Protection Clause and concluding that
“[t]he idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be
accepted as an analytical leap forward”).
114. See Strauss, supra note 69, at 173–75; see infra Section III.A.1.
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proposition.115 While the cases seemingly unfold on two separate doctrinal
tracks, they ultimately meet in the Ricci decision. Of course, the Court does
not decide the ultimate issue of whether “the strong-basis-in-evidence standard
would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause,”116 but its decision to employ
Fourteenth Amendment standards to analyze the validity of Title VII disparate
impact claims means that any “predictions”117 are much more than mere dicta.
Indeed, there is a thematic connection from Brown v. Board of Education to
Parents Involved to Ricci that leads to the conclusion that “equality” is more
about preserving superficial access and neutrality than about eradicating deeply
rooted structural inequities.118
Brown is about the tension between process (equal educational opportunity
through desegregation) and results (dismantling dual school systems and
substantively integrating schools).119 Years of litigation culminating in
Parents Involved did not resolve this tension.120 However, the tension between
process and substance embodied in Brown is essential to understanding the
inevitable decisions of Parents Involved and Ricci.
Milliken v. Bradley121 and Washington v. Davis122 are seminal cases in the
Court’s race jurisprudential canon: Milliken marks the narrow limits of raceconscious remedial efforts to eradicate dual school systems,123 and Davis all
but ensures that race-conscious remedial efforts will uniformly be held
unconstitutional in the absence of clearly identifiable discrimination.124 Both
decisions embrace discriminatory intent as the touchstone of equal protection

115. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (“[T]he process was open and fair. The problem, of course, is
that after the tests were completed, the raw racial results became the predominant rationale for the
City’s refusal to certify the results.”).
116. Id. at 2676.
117. Id. at 2682–83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure of the Colorblind
Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 383–85 (2008).
119. Wendy B. Scott, Dr. King and Parents Involved: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, 32
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 543, 544–46 (2008); Powell, supra note 118, at 391–92.
120. See Powell, supra note 118, at 371 n.33, 371–416 (2008); Symposium, The Future of
School Integration in America, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 559 (2008); Enid Trucios-Haynes &
Cedric Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of Colorblind Constitutionalism: Individualism, Race and
Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 947, 948 n.8 (2008).
121. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
122. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
123. 418 U.S. at 745 (“[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no
constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.”).
124. 426 U.S. at 230, 239, 242 (holding that disproportionate impact is insufficient to
establish an equal protection violation); see also Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism
Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The ID, The Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40
CONN. L. REV. 931, 952–55 (2008) (critiquing the Washington v. Davis intent requirement as
rigid and formulaic because it minimizes the significance of racial impact on historically
oppressed people of color).
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analysis.125 Once the decision is made to import these concepts into Title VII
jurisprudence, the inversion of disparate impact case concepts into disparate
treatment (intent) analysis is inevitable.126 Thus, there is a readily discernible
doctrinal thread between Parents Involved and Ricci:
The mechanism for redefining discrimination was the extension and
application of affirmative action precedent and analysis to other areas of law.
The most recent example is Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District, where the Roberts majority opinion relied almost exclusively
on affirmative action case law—specifically Grutter v. Bollinger—rather than
the body of school desegregation law, to strike down school integration plans.
Ricci similarly relies on affirmative action cases rather than disparate treatment
cases, importing strict scrutiny into Title VII doctrine. Analogizing to
affirmative action cases in the context of equal protection jurisprudence, the
Court in Ricci found that, just as strict scrutiny requires the government to
justify its race-conscious remedial measures by evidence of a compelling
interest and the lack of viable alternatives, so too does Title VII require that
before an employer can take a race-conscious action like canceling test results
that favor whites—a per se disparate treatment violation—it must have a
127
strong basis in evidence that the remedial actions are necessary.

This conceptual, doctrinal, and rhetorical move is an example of Rhetorical
Neutrality. “Three underlying myths—historical, definitional, and rhetorical—
all serve to shift the interpretative (doctrinal) framework on questions of race
from an analysis of systemic [structural] racism to a literal conception of
equality where the anti-differentiation principle is the guiding touchstone.”128
The Court’s post-racial analysis begins with the proposition that anything that
burdens white privilege is reverse discrimination that is presumptively
unconstitutional (or a violation of Title VII).129 What is striking about all of
the Court’s reverse discrimination decisions is that history is ignored; then
discrimination is defined so narrowly and formalistically that reverse
discrimination suits are presumptively valid, while race-conscious remedial
efforts are presumptively invalid; finally, neutral rhetoric is employed to
explain why inequality is “natural” and inevitable. This rhetorical move
derives its power from all of the critiques of race-based affirmative action,130

125. Powell, supra note 118, at 407, 412–13 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–48; Milliken, 418
U.S. at 745).
126. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675–76 (2009) (citation omitted) (relying on
Wygant and Croson and noting that “an amorphous claim that there has been past
discrimination . . . cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota” (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989))).
127. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 116–17 (footnotes omitted).
128. Powell, supra note 9, at 831 (footnotes omitted).
129. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
130. See Morrison, supra note 75, at 314.
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and it can be distilled into one phrase: the Constitution protects equal
opportunity, not equal results.131 “Antidiscrimination law is transformed into
race discrimination because a law that presumed minorities should receive
outcomes in similar proportions to whites constitutes making nonwhites
‘special favorites of the law’—virtual affirmative action.”132
This has been a central tension in the Court’s race jurisprudence for over
one hundred years. Indeed, a mere eighteen years after the end of slavery, the
Court proclaimed that:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must
be some stage in the process of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as
a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
133
men’s rights are protected.

The infamous Civil Rights Cases dealt a death blow to the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 and marked the end of the substantive legislation enacted during the
Reconstruction Era.134 All of the themes against race-conscious remedial
measures are present here: the legislative efforts of Congress to strike down
barriers in private and public accommodations is illegitimate, result-oriented
“beneficent legislation”; the oppressed are “special favorites of the law” (a
central tenet of any reverse discrimination claim); and the process “works” for
everyone without reference to the enduring history of subjugation. It is
breathtaking how eager the Court is to forget the badges and incidents of
slavery still at work in 1883;135 it is even more so when the Court adopts the
same rhetorical posture in 2011.

131. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“[O]nce that process has been established and employers have
made clear their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an
employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race. . . . [This] is antithetical
to the notion of a workplace where individuals are guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of
race.”). Thus, Title VII protects equal opportunity—everyone is eligible to take the examination
notwithstanding its disproportionate impact on African-American firefighters—not equal results
because to “equalize” the results would mean displacing the settled expectations of the white
firefighters who simply did well on an examination that measures “merit.” To the Court, this is
statutorily prohibited racial decision-making. Id. at 2662, 2673, 2676; see also infra Section
III.A.
132. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 118 (emphasis added).
133. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (emphasis added).
134. See Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521
(1989) (reviewing ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877 (1988)).
135. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1365–66 (2007) (“[T]here is
general agreement in the cases and scholarship that the Thirteenth Amendment empowers
Congress to prohibit what it rationally determines to be badges and incidents of slavery.”).
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Milliken, Davis, and Parents Involved all fit squarely within this
jurisprudential canon that race-conscious remedies afford people of color
unconstitutional results.136 Since any formal shackles have been removed,
everyone has the same opportunity, and therefore burdens should not be
imposed on similarly situated individuals based on race. These Fourteenth
Amendment decisions lead directly to Ricci because the Court transforms a
Title VII disparate impact case into a reverse discrimination affirmative action
case.137 So, discriminatory intent under the Fourteenth Amendment merges
with disparate treatment under Title VII—there must be particularized
discriminatory intent to advance a Fourteenth Amendment claim, and now
there must be a “strong basis in evidence,” under Title VII, to believe that
remedial action is “necessary to avoid violating the disparate-impact
provision.”138 The net effect of these doctrinal maneuvers is to erect virtually
insurmountable barriers of proof to legitimate claims of discrimination and to
chill voluntary efforts to eradicate structural inequality.139
Rhetorically, Milliken constitutionalizes process over substantive results—
the opportunity to attend integrated schools extends only within the district line
where de jure discrimination has been identified.140 This is the doctrinal
precursor to Davis. The same proposition unifies both decisions: In the
absence of particularized discrimination, race-conscious remedial efforts to

136. Powell, supra note 118, at 363–64, 373.
137. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 116–17; see also supra note 127 and
accompanying text.
138. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009).
139. Hutchinson, supra note 45, at 958 (“The intent rule, like the affirmative action doctrine,
treats racism as aberrational or nonexistent, and the Court strives to rebut invidious explanations
for racially disparate state action.”). Identifying the doctrinal link between the Court’s post-racial
equal protection jurisprudence and its Title VII jurisprudence, Professor Hutchinson writes:
The Court has also justified adherence to a rigid intent standard on the grounds that a
more flexible rule could lead to quotas or reverse discrimination against whites.
Accordingly, Court doctrine in this context mirrors majoritarian distrust of civil rights
remedies and claims of injustice. In early Title VII cases, for example, the Court treated
disparate impact evidence as probative of unlawful discrimination. The conservative
Rehnquist Court, however, would later abandon this approach and toughen the evidentiary
burden required of plaintiffs. The Court announced its more exacting standard in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. The Court concluded that a flexible rule would cause
employers to adopt hiring quotas, thus discriminating against whites . . . . Following
criticism from civil rights advocates, Congress overruled Wards Cove in 1991, but only
after President Bush vetoed and characterized a prior version as a “quota bill.” The
conservative opposition to this legislation provides another example of the way in which
political rhetoric frames civil rights measures as invidious discrimination.
Hutchinson, supra note 45, at 961–62 (footnotes omitted).
140. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (“[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.”).
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dismantle systemic inequality are presumptively unconstitutional.141 Next, the
Court will draw upon the Fourteenth Amendment intent requirement and
extend it to buttress reverse discrimination lawsuits. Finally, the Court will
create the strong basis in evidence requirement to fortify Title VII reverse
discrimination complaints. All of these doctrines preserve white privilege and
entitlement.142
A.

Milliken v. Bradley
In Milliken, the Court concluded that:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing
a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a
constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant
143
segregative effect in another district.

Since “the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation,” there can be no interdistrict remedy in the absence of
an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect.144 Remedies stop at the district
line in the absence of identifiable, district-wide segregation.145
Milliken is a seminal decision because it literally changes the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the school cases and beyond. It lays the
doctrinal groundwork for the post-racial Parents Involved decision, and it sets
the stage for the post-racial merging of Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
principles in Ricci. The doctrinal thread that runs through all of the decisions
is the protection of white interests and privilege. The Court literally ignores
evidence of systemic racial discrimination in order to preserve suburban school
districts and insulate them from the burden of urban integration.146 As
Professor Tribe observes:

141. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675 (“[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past
discrimination . . . cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.” (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989))); Erica E. Hoodhood, Note, The
Quintessential Employer’s Dilemma: Combating Title VII Litigation by Meeting the Elusive
Strong Basis in Evidence Standard, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 111, 151 (2010) (“[T]he conflicting
disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions make it nearly impossible for employers to
take any remedial actions to alleviate adverse impact without making themselves susceptible to
disparate treatment or reverse discrimination litigation by white class members.”); infra Section
III.A.3–4.
142. See Barbara J. Flagg,”Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 960, 987–88, 1007 (1993).
143. 418 U.S. at 744–45.
144. Id. at 744, 745.
145. Id. at 145.
146. Id. at 781–815 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (cataloguing the purposeful actions of the
Detroit Board of Education to maintain segregated urban schools in the core of the city with
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By demanding a tight fit between the remedy and the narrowly-defined right in
the face of extensive de jure segregation, the Court for the first time
rationalized a segregated result in a case where a constitutional violation had
been found to exist. . . . The plaintiffs were to be trapped within the city’s
boundaries, without even an opportunity to demand that those boundary lines
be justified as either rational or innocently nonrational. Thus Milliken became
the first case in which the Supreme Court overruled a desegregation decree,
only three years after Swann—the case in which the Court had first reviewed
such a decree and upheld the sweeping remedial power of the federal district
147
courts.

The sweeping remedial mandate of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,148 is significantly narrowed in Milliken—the Constitution
protects equal opportunity, but only in its most narrow and formalistic form:
The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to
attend a unitary school system in that district. . . . The view of the dissenters,
that the existence of a dual system in Detroit can be made the basis for a
decree requiring cross-district transportation of pupils, cannot be supported on
the grounds that it represents merely the devising of a suitably flexible remedy
149
for the violation of rights already established by our prior decisions.

Thus, the understanding of remedy and injury in the school context is
dramatically altered in Milliken: Discrimination is not viewed as a
manifestation of structural inequality or systemic bias; rather, discrimination is
discrete and particularized. A dual school system can be clearly identified in
Detroit, and the predominantly white suburban enclaves have no connection to
the urban segregation in Detroit.150 Here, inequality (or the existence of

outlying suburbs remaining predominantly white); Derek W. Black, The Uncertain Future of
School Desegregation and the Importance of Goodwill, Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision,
57 CATH. U. L. REV. 947, 951–52 (2008) (“Milliken signaled to whites that they could avoid
desegregation and build exclusive enclaves by simply moving across the school district line. In
that respect, Milliken likely exacerbated segregation.” (footnote omitted)).
147. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16–19, at 1495 (2d ed.1988)
(footnotes omitted).
148. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see also Powell, supra note 118, at 397–406 (discussing Swann and
how the decision embraces a broad view of the scope of federal power to dismantle dual school
systems while at the same time limiting the reach of that power based upon how discrimination is
defined).
149. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746–47 (first emphasis added).
150. Id. at 747, 748–52. This rationale of “natural” discriminatory outcomes—where the
interests of African-Americans are ignored and the interests of “displaced” whites are
privileged—is employed in both Parents Involved and Ricci. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 750 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[R]acial imbalance
can also result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing
choices.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (“[A] prima facie case of disparateimpact liability—essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . is far
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predominantly white schools) is “natural” because the Constitution does not
guarantee results: “Where the schools of only one district have been affected,
there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing the
racial composition of that district’s schools with those of the surrounding
districts.”151
Rejecting the Court’s process-based interpretation of Brown and
reaffirming its central holding under the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice
Marshall’s dissent articulates a substantive view of equality.152 Justice
Marshall explicitly eschews neutrality by stating that African-American
students are “not only entitled to neutral nondiscriminatory treatment,”153 but
to a fully integrated school system.154 The Fourteenth Amendment’s
constitutional mandate does demand equal results: Nondiscriminatory
treatment is insufficient because this neutral jurisprudential stance may
preserve existing systems of caste.155 The Fourteenth Amendment permits race
conscious remedial approaches to eradicate the present day effects of past
discrimination.156 Nevertheless, the Court has erected nearly insurmountable
burdens of proof to valid claims of racial discrimination. Parents Involved, a
direct doctrinal descendent of Milliken, Davis, and Ricci, with its imported
Fourteenth Amendment “strong basis in evidence” standard, followed this
same hostile practice of constructing nearly impregnable barriers of proof.157
As Professor Derrick Bell observes:
The Supreme Court concedes that its decisions requiring hard-to-obtain
evidence of overt discrimination as the prerequisite for challenging facially
neutral policies that work clear disadvantage on blacks are founded on the fear
that blacks would upset any number of otherwise legitimate government
policies if relief from such policies could be based on proof of disparate impact
alone. The issues these cases raise are complex, but the proof standards
adopted in Washington v. Davis . . . reflect a priority for concerns of whites
and vested property-type interests over the unfulfilled equality requests by
blacks. I fear that these racial priorities differ more in scope than in kind from

from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it
certified the results.”); see infra Section III.A.
151. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 749.
152. Id. at 798–808 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 798. This is the Court’s literal interpretation of “equal opportunity” (or mere
access).
154. Id. at 808 (“It is a hollow remedy indeed where ‘after supposed ‘desegregation’ the
school remained segregated in fact.’” (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 495 (D.D.C.
1967))).
155. Id.
156. Powell, supra note 12, at 930–32.
157. 551 U.S. 701, 754–55 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the racial policy formulation that enabled the Constitution’s slavery
158
compromises.

The Court’s concession underscores its steadfast adherence to a processbased approach to racial claims of discrimination.159 In the absence of clearly
identifiable discrimination, the process is deemed to be functioning
appropriately; any disparate impact is explainable as a legitimate outcome that
cannot be overturned by an illegitimate guarantee of equality based on race.
Thus, any interdistrict remedy in Milliken would be constitutionally infirm to
the Court because the remedy would exceed the scope of identifiable
discrimination within Detroit.160 “With its emphasis on the significance of
local control over the operation of schools, and its caution regarding the
essentially political character of the role played by federal courts in devising
and enforcing metropolitan school desegregation, Milliken signaled the
Supreme Court’s mounting hesitation in the school desegregation area.”161
Indeed, the local control rationale has been conveniently manipulated by the
Court to determine the scope of permissible remedies. For example, in
Milliken, local control stopped at the district line—it would be disruptive to the
process to impose an interdistrict remedy “without an interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect.”162 The scope of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy; in the absence of intentional discrimination by the state, there can be
no interdistrict remedy.163
The disproportionate impact on African-Americans in the segregated
schools of Detroit is not directly attributable to interdistrict state action by
suburban districts, so a race-conscious remedy is impermissible. To reach this
narrow conclusion, the Court had to ignore clear evidence of systemic
discrimination164 and construct a slanted interpretation of the de jure-de facto
distinction.165 Since de jure discrimination is only identifiable in Detroit, the
158. Xerces, supra note 32, at 1611 (footnote omitted).
159. See id.
160. The same rationale prohibiting remedies that exceed the scope of identifiable
discrimination connects Milliken, Davis, Parents Involved, and Ricci. See infra Sections II.B–C
& III.
161. TRIBE, supra note 147, §16–19, at 1495 (footnotes omitted).
162. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743, 745 (1974) (posing a number of rhetorical
questions to illustrate the inherent problems of consolidating fifty-four independent school
districts).
163. Id. at 744–45.
164. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; Milliken, 418 U.S. at 762–63, 770–81
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that the “unquestioned violations of the equal protection rights” of
African-American school students in Detroit’s segregated schools should not be remedied by a
cramped rule that stops integration at the school district line).
165. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 785 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional violation found
here was not some de facto racial imbalance, but rather the purposeful, intentional, massive, de
jure segregation of the Detroit city schools . . . .”).
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remedy is limited to Detroit and cannot cross the boundary line into the
suburbs.166
Milliken essentially says that, with the exception of the inner-city core of
Detroit itself, there is nothing to remedy.167 All of the remaining segregative
factors, such as a predominantly black urban core surrounded by nearly allwhite suburbs, escalating white flight, and a substantial number of one-race
schools, are all de facto in origin. Discrimination in fact is yet another
formulation of the Court’s conception that disproportionate impact is
irremediable. Washington v. Davis builds upon this theme by specifically
referencing the de jure-de facto distinction in its discussion of disproportionate
impact.168 This ultimately leads to the “strong basis in evidence” standard in
Ricci.169 If there is no identifiable discrimination against African-Americans in
school assignments,170 applications to the D.C. police department,171 or in
promotions in the fire department,172 then disparate impact is irrelevant.
B.

Washington v. Davis

Rejecting a claim advanced by unsuccessful applicants for the police force
in Washington, D.C., where there was evidence that African-Americans failed
the entrance examination in disproportionately higher numbers than whites, the
Court held that disproportionate racial impact standing alone was insufficient
to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.173 There must be
discriminatory purpose and disproportionate impact.174 What is striking about
Davis is how it narrowly defines discrimination; while disproportionate impact
is not constitutionally irrelevant, it cannot sustain an Equal Protection
challenge without discriminatory intent.175 The decision also references the
school desegregation cases for the proposition that there must be

166. Justice Marshall offers a devastating assessment of this cynical reasoning by the Court.
Id. at 804–05 (discussing white flight and the doughnut effect with core predominantly Black
schools in Detroit ringed by all white suburbs).
167. Id. at 783–84.
168. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
169. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009).
170. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 721 (2007).
(“Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong that
allowed race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other
basis.”).
171. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.
172. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (“The City’s actions [rejecting the test results to avoid disparate
impact liability] would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid
defense.”).
173. Davis, 426 U.S. at 229, 244.
174. Id. at 238–48.
175. Id.
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discriminatory intent.176 The Court specifically references the de jure-de facto
distinction to support the following proposition: that there are both
predominantly black and predominantly white schools in a community is not
alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause. “The essential element of de
jure segregation is ‘a current condition of segregation resulting from
intentional state action.’ . . . ‘The differentiating factor between de jure
segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to
segregate.’”177
Intent, then, or some identifiable discriminatory action is the touchstone of
the Court’s analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. In the school cases,
the de jure-de facto distinction serves as a line of remedial demarcation—if
discrimination exists, it must be explained through intent.178 Davis and
Milliken are ways of explaining the permanence of racial discrimination.179 In
other words, there are aspects of discrimination that cannot be addressed.
Societal discrimination is irrelevant because it cannot be traced or connected to
any identifiable discriminatory perpetrator.180 “[I]n Davis uncertainty about
the cause of racially subordinating impact leads to the default position of no
suspicion of racism. In the affirmative action and recent desegregation cases,
uncertainty about the motives of those attempting to remedy racial
subordination leads to the default suspicion of racism.”181 Since the
Constitution protects equal opportunity and access to the process, there is
nothing constitutionally suspect about substantial numbers of AfricanAmerican candidates failing an examination.182 Moreover, it would be
constitutionally suspect to guarantee results on the basis of race.183 Process is
privileged over substance. This doctrinal inversion, where disproportionate

176. Id. at 240.
177. Id. (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205, 208 (1973)) (emphasis added);
see also Powell, supra note 118, at 412–13.
178. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
179. Id. at 245–48; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
180. See Powell, supra note 118, at 414–16 (discussing the neutral rhetorical devices
employed by the Court to rationalize subordination).
181. Id. at 415 (quoting Lawrence, supra note 124, at 954).
182. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245–46. (“[W]e have difficulty understanding how a law establishing
a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies
‘any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail
to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.”).
183. The Davis Court found:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.
Id. at 248.
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impact is merely circumstantially relevant and race-conscious remedial
approaches are presumptively unconstitutional, serves as the foundation for
reverse discrimination claims.
Milliken and Davis buttress reverse
discrimination claims like those advanced in Parents Involved and Ricci. In
many ways, the merger between Fourteenth Amendment post-racial principles
and Title VII is complete.
C. Parents Involved: Post-Racialism
Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Parents Involved represents a
doctrinal shift in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment race jurisprudence—the
Court reinterprets Brown, so that it is no longer a decision grounded in the
historic anti-caste and anti-subordination principles of the Reconstruction
Amendments; rather, Brown is transformed into a decision about the
colorblindness of individual school choice.
Parents Involved is breathtaking in its unbridled judicial determinism—the
opinion is virtually an afterthought flowing from the result: it rejects the use of
race-conscious remedies, it ignores precedent and rejects the substantive
mandate of Brown, it extends colorblind constitutionalism, so that the concept
of diversity is narrowly cabined to the University context, and it negates local
control of the school system directly contradicting its own precedent and
184
principles of federalism.

The local control rationale here is distorted yet again.185 In cases like
Milliken and its progeny, the Court relied on the local control rationale to curb
the “anti-democratic” reach of federal equitable power in school cases.186
184. Powell, supra note 118, at 431 (footnotes omitted).
185. See supra Section II.A.
186. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (finding an interdistrict remedy of
increased spending to bring whites into the school district was invalid in the absence of an
interdistrict violation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–91 (1992) (holding the federal courts
should return supervisory control to local authorities as soon as possible; indeed, federal control
may be withdrawn completely or partially based on good-faith compliance with the desegregation
decree); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991) (finding that, based on good faith
finding of compliance, a district court may dissolve a desegregation order where the vestiges of
de jure segregation had been eradicated “to the extent practicable”); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434–35 (1976) (stressing a temporal limit on federal court
intervention, the Court concluded that once a court implemented a racially neutral attendance
plan, in the absence of intentional racially discriminatory actions by the school board, the court
could not adjust its desegregation order to address population shifts in the school district);
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974) (holding interdistrict remedies must be specifically
tailored to address interdistrict violations).
[I]n a succession of sharply divided opinions issued in 1991, 1992, and 1995, Chief
Justice Rehnquist invested “local control” of schooling with a constitutional weight that
counterbalanced the earlier Warren Court’s concern for racial discrimination and
educational injury.
....
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Essentially, the Court deferred to local school boards’ decision-making
powers. Ironically, this deference did not necessarily translate into positive
results for integrated school districts. Milliken is a paradigmatic example of
this.
In Parents Involved, the Court shifts course and invalidates voluntary plans
adopted by the Louisville and Seattle school boards.187 The Court rejects local
decision-making because the sole purpose of both plans was racial balancing:
“In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and
simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”188
Racial balancing is unconstitutional because it guarantees a result—a specified
quantum of racial proportionality in the schools—based on race.189 The Court
advances four distinct doctrinal strands to form the post-racial decision in
Parents Involved: (i) it elevates the de jure-de facto distinction as a standing
requirement that essentially eliminates any consideration of race in the absence
of specific discrimination; (ii) it promotes liberal individualism as the
touchstone of Fourteenth Amendment analysis so that an individual’s school
choice is commodified and the anti-subordination principle is fundamentally
displaced; (iii) the spectra of racial politics is employed to emphasize the
“illegitimacy” of local decision-making premised on race; and (iv) the
protection of the interests of innocent whites is an unifying theme under all of
the rationales discussed here.190
1. Colorblind Skepticism and Particularized Discrimination
The result in Parents Involved is assured after the Court frames the issue as
involving the distribution of benefits and burdens on the basis of race subject
to strict scrutiny review: “It is well established that when the government
distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications,
that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”191 Benefits and burdens should
be distributed on a race neutral basis. If there is no particularized
discrimination to remedy, then race-conscious remedies are presumptively

Collectively, these decisions send [the] unmistakable [message] that district courts should
begin winding up the process of desegregation. . . . Most commentators agree that the
unfortunate, but predicted, effect of these decisions was the commencement of a
significant trend toward resegregation.
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Fifty Years Later, It’s Time to Mend Brown’s Broken Promise, U. ILL. L.
REV. 1203, 1210–11 (2004) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted); see also Lawrence, supra
note 124, at 934 n.5.
187. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
188. Id. at 726.
189. Id. at 726–35.
190. See id. at 701–48.
191. Id. at 720 (majority opinion).
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unconstitutional because they skew the process toward one race (AfricanAmericans and people of color) over another (whites).192
There is no compelling state interest to remedy a constitutional wrong that
cannot be identified. Societal discrimination cannot be remedied by racialbalancing.193 Thus, there is a fundamental shift in the evaluation of
constitutionally cognizable harm: The concern is not with the present day
effects of past discrimination and the inevitability of resegregation in the
absence of race-conscious remedial efforts, but with the harm on white
individuals whose entitlement to school choice has been prejudiced by race.194
2. Liberal Individualism
Reconceptualizing Brown as a formalist opinion which focused on the
legal separation of children on the basis of race,195 and not on the stigmatizing
effects of caste-based oppression condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment,196
the Court concludes that there is an individual right to school assignments on a
nonracial basis.197 Thus, what gives substance to the “constitutional violation”
in Parents Involved is that the process is flawed because it seeks to guarantee
equal results by employing race in school assignments:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to
school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have
not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once
again—even for very different reasons. For schools that never segregated on
the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past
segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way “to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis” is to stop
assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the
198
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.

To the Court, there is a moral and doctrinal equivalence between the castebased, racial oppression that was the organizing principle of American life
before Brown and the good faith, voluntary remedial efforts to avoid the

192. See id. at 721.
193. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730–33 (plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 719 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 746–47 (plurality opinion).
196. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST
HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 261 (2004) (“The effective compromise
reached in the United States at the close of the twentieth century is that schools may be
segregated by race as long as it is not due to direct government fiat.”).
197. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746–47 (plurality opinion).
198. Id. at 747–48 (citation omitted).
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resegregation of public schools.199 Under this reasoning, any use of race that
cannot be justified in neutral terms will be unconstitutional.
3. Racial Politics
In Parents Involved, the Court suggests that the school assignment systems
in Louisville and Seattle are fundamentally flawed because they are slanted
toward a defined range based on demographics, and this is nothing more than a
quota to the Court created by a political system committed to unconstitutional
racial balancing200:
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to
our repeated recognition that at the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat
citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual
or national class. Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would
effectively assure that race will always be relevant in American life, and that
the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking
201
such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race will never be achieved.

All of this makes clear that reverse discrimination suits, whether under the
Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII, will have great currency and appeal to the
Court. The impact on innocent parties, those whites who are entitled to either
a colorblind neighborhood school assignment or a promotion based on a test
with disparate consequences for African-Americans, will be carefully
scrutinized.
4. Limited Duration of Impact on Innocent Parties
Ironically, the Court rejects the First Amendment rationale of viewpoint
diversity that is at the core of the Grutter v. Bollinger decision,202 concluding
that racial diversity is not a compelling interest to sustain the school
Viewpoint and racial diversity are integral
assignment programs.203
components to successful school integration plans,204 but the Court refuses to

199. See OGLETREE, supra note 196, at 261 (“[W]hite children attend schools where 80
percent of the student body is also white, resulting in the highest level of segregation of any
group.”).
200. 551 U.S. at 729 (plurality opinion).
201. Id. at 730 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
202. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
203. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732 (plurality opinion).
204. See Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science Evidence in
Parents Involved and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 703, 728–32 (2008) (discussing the social science literature documenting the democratizing
effects of diverse schools).
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extend Grutter to the elementary and secondary school context.205 This is
because the use of race has “no logical stopping point,”206 and this would mean
that there would be a burden on innocent (white) parties who had no
connection to any alleged discrimination against African-Americans. There is
no constitutional right to a result in the form of racial proportionality in the
populations of elementary and secondary schools.207 This is particularly so
when racial balancing, for its own sake, displaces the individual right to
colorblind school assignments:
The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not
semantics.
Racial balancing is not transformed from “patently
unconstitutional” to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it “racial
diversity.” While the school districts use various verbal formulations to
describe the interest they seek to promote—racial diversity, avoidance of racial
isolation, racial integration—they offer no definition of the interest that
208
suggests it differs from racial balance.

While this neutral rhetoric is appealing on a superficial level, it represents
a fundamentally distorted view of the significance of Brown and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Milliken, Davis, and Parents Involved all advance the same
doctrinal proposition: In the absence of identifiable discrimination, raceconscious remedial approaches are constitutionally suspect.209 This leaves a
substantial portion of structural inequality irremediable. In Milliken, interdistrict remedies are confined to the district line,210 in Davis, the
disproportionate number of African-American candidates who failed the police
cadet examination is a rational outcome because the process itself is open and
accessible to all,211 and in Parents Involved, resegregation is not even
considered as a real possibility because de facto societal discrimination is
insufficient to support the use of race-conscious remedies.212 This proposition

205. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723–25 (majority opinion).
206. Id. at 731 (plurality opinion) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 498 (1989)).
207. See id. at 723–25 (majority opinion).
208. Id. at 732 (plurality opinion).
209. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
248–50 (1976); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion).
210. 418 U.S. at 744–47 (explaining that without an interdistrict violation, an interdistrict
remedy is prohibited).
211. What is striking about Washington v. Davis is that the Court rejected disparate impact
analysis under Title VII, concluding that the lower court had applied the wrong standard. Davis,
426 U.S. at 238. So, the Court ignored Griggs, as it would do over thirty years later in Ricci:
“But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard
to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact.” Id. at 239.
212. 551 U.S. at 729–33 (plurality opinion) (explaining that racial balance and proportionality
is not guaranteed by the Constitution).
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is precisely what underlies the “strong basis in evidence” rationale that the
Court advances for the first time in a Title VII case in Ricci.213
While the Court pretends that the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII
have not been merged into one post-racial principle, it is obvious that Ricci is a
doctrinal extension of all of the Fourteenth Amendment rationales discussed
here. All of the themes identified in Section C, supra, are present in the Ricci
decision.214 Indeed, this trend was already well underway, as Professor Spann
noted, over a decade ago when he concluded that “a five-justice majority . . .
may be willing to disallow the voluntary affirmative action that the Supreme
Court authorized in [United Steelworkers v.]Weber, [443 U.S. 193 (1979)],” a
Title VII decision standing for the proposition that voluntary affirmative action
plans are permissible “even in the absence of a showing of prior unlawful
discrimination.”215 With an even more conservative bloc of justices—Chief
Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—this prediction
has become a stark reality in Ricci.216
Doctrinally, the Court has consistently engaged in an assault on voluntary
race-conscious remedial measures; the only question is whether different
standards are applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII. There
was doctrinal room for the Court to expand its constitutional colorblindness
into its Title VII post-racialism. Parents Involved and Ricci both explicitly
reject voluntary remedial efforts to eradicate the present day effects of past
discrimination.217 Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII, the Court
has effectively rejected the political judgment of communities committed to
substantive equality.218 This transforms voluntary remedial efforts to eradicate
structural inequality in the workplace into admissions of liability by the

213. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
214. Id. at 2672–73.
215. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 175 (2000).
216. Professor Spann’s prescient observation leads directly to Ricci:
It may be that Adarand itself renders unconstitutional any reading of Title VII that does
not insist on demonstrable prior discrimination as a prerequisite to voluntary affirmative
action. . . . it may be that the similar official encouragement to engage in race-conscious
employment decisions in order to avoid a potential Title VII violation would also violate
the equal protection clause—at least in the absence of a showing that such race
consciousness was a narrowly tailored remedy for past discrimination.
Id. at 175 (footnotes omitted). While the Court insists that it does not decide the issue of whether
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are co-extensive in application and scope, Ricci, 129 S.
Ct. at 2675–76, it nevertheless borrows heavily from the Fourteenth Amendment to create the
strong basis in evidence standard which requires some level of intent (at least in the sense that
disparate impact is insufficient to support a good faith attempt to avoid Title VII liability under
that provision). See infra Section III.4.
217. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733–34 (plurality opinion).
218. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733–34 (plurality opinion).
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employer.219 Unless there is a strong basis in evidence that a specific
disproportionality will lead to a Title VII claim, the Court will presume that
there is a cognizable reverse discrimination claim.220
III. RICCI V. DESTEFANO
The common doctrinal proposition that integrates the Court’s post-racial
jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII is that “[t]he
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”221 All of the underlying post-racial themes underpinning the
Parents Involved decision are present in Ricci: there is a marked skepticism
toward any race-conscious remedial approach;222 the rights of individual white
test takers who passed the examination are presumptively valid so that a good
faith effort by the City to avoid disparate impact liability is inverted into a
disparate (reverse discrimination) treatment claim;223 Justice Alito’s
concurrence employs stereotypical rhetoric reminiscent of revisionist
Reconstruction histories to “illustrate” how race skewed the “neutral”
process;224 and there is an even more pronounced concern here, under Title
VII, that the innocent, hardworking white firefighters not be deprived of the
awards for their meritorious achievement.225

219. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27; supra note 141 and accompanying text.
220. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673–81.
221. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion).
222. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (“Without some other justification . . . race-based decision
making violates Title VII . . . .”). Likewise, in Parents Involved, since race predominated in the
school assignment process, the plans in Louisville and Seattle were held to be unconstitutional.
551 U.S. at 723.
223. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674–77 (reasoning that because the promotion tests were job-related
and consistent with business necessity, then any attempt to alter the results was nothing more than
racial engineering designed to undermine the legitimate individual right to be evaluated on a
nonracial basis). This strand of liberal individualism is present in Parents Involved when the
Court advances the notion of an individual right to attend schools on a non-racial basis. 551 U.S.
at 743 (plurality opinion).
224. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684–89 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the City’s good faith,
voluntary effort to avoid disparate impact liability was merely pretextual; the real reason for
decertifying the test results was to “please a politically important racial constituency”). In
Parents Involved, the Court rejected the voluntary efforts of school officials to maintain
integrated schools, in the face of growing resegregation, because there was nothing to remedy.
551 U.S. at 732–33 (plurality opinion). Under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment, there
must be something identifiable (a constitutional or statutory violation) to remedy; otherwise, the
Court will view any race-conscious remedial approach as invalid because it seeks to guarantee a
result on a racial basis. See supra Section I.
225. The Court itself privileges this narrative in Ricci. See 129 S. Ct. at 2689 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (cataloguing the personal sacrifices of Frank Ricci and the only person of color to
join the reverse discrimination suit, Latino firefighter Benjamin Vargas); see also A.G.
Sulzberger, For Hispanic Firefighter in Bias Suit, Awkward Position But Firm Resolve, N.Y.
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Title VII and the Meaning of Discrimination

It was well-settled precedent in the Second Circuit, where the firefighters’
reverse discrimination claim arose, that disparate impact on minorities could be
avoided without triggering a disparate treatment claim.226 There was a brightline between both types of discrimination. In Ricci, the Court merges both
types of discrimination so that intentional caste-based, racial discrimination is
no different analytically than an attempt to avoid a disproportionately racial
impact on a historically oppressed group. Just as there is no distinction
between malign and benign discrimination under the Court’s Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence,227 there is no distinction between intentional
discrimination (disparate treatment) and good-faith, race-conscious remedial
attempts to avoid disparate impact liability under Title VII.228 Race is viewed
skeptically, and liberal individualism is the touchstone.229 This is the context
in which Ricci was decided. The Court’s most glaring departure from
precedent was its reinterpretation of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Title
VII.230

TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A20. But see Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the white firefighters “had no vested right to promotion”).
226. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 728–29
(4th ed. 2011) (“It should be noted that civil rights statutes can, and often do, allow violations to
be proved based on discriminatory impact without evidence of a discriminatory purpose. For
example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Acts allows employment discrimination to be
established by proof of discriminatory impact.” (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971))); Luke Appling, Recent Development: Ricci v. DeStefano, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
147, 148 (2010) (“[T]he majority ignored its own Title VII precedent that tolerated disparate
impacts only when the employer could demonstrate true ‘business necessity’ or ‘job
related[ness].’ In its place, the majority crafted a seemingly difficult to satisfy ‘strong basis in
evidence’ standard out of unrelated Equal Protection Clause cases.” (footnote omitted)).
227. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Equal Protection
Clause protects individuals, not racial groups, and stating that “[s]imply because the school
districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race
to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny”).
228. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“[U]nder Title VII, before an employer can engage in
intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional
disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to
disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”). The Court
conflates discriminatory intent so that an attempt to avoid disparate impact liability is transformed
into disparate treatment of displaced white employees of the fire department. See infra Section
III.3.
229. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672–73.
230. 401 U.S. at 425–26.
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1. Structural Inequality: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
In the Court’s race jurisprudential canon, Griggs is the rare decision that
rejects neutrality,231 eschews the narrow intent-perpetrator rhetoric of antidiscrimination law,232 and embraces the concept of structural inequality as a
present day effect of past discrimination.233 Structural inequality is a way of
describing the permanence of racism234 and its adaptability in the face of
incremental societal progress:
The term structural inequality is broad and is in a rough sense the inverse of
the state action doctrine. That is, structural inequality refers to existing
conditions of inequality that are not directly attributable to a specific past act
of governmental discrimination that would give rise to a right to raceconscious relief under the Equal Protection Clause. It includes “the
institutional defaults, established structures, and social or political norms that
may appear to be . . . neutral, non-individual focused, and otherwise rational,
235
but that taken together create and reinforce” segregation and inequality.

Parents Involved and Ricci fit squarely within Rhetorical Neutrality236: in
both decisions, history is ignored so that the present day effects of past
discrimination are not analyzed, discrimination is defined so narrowly that it is
nearly impossible to advance a discrimination claim, yet reverse discrimination
claims are presumptively valid, and neutral rhetoric is advanced to rationalize
inequality.237 Thus, the Court’s recent reinterpretation of Title VII is nearly
the final step in constructing its post-racial jurisprudence:
In Parents Involved, the Court came within one vote of holding that there is no
compelling state interest in ameliorating de facto racial segregation. Such a
holding, combined with aggressive application of disparate impact doctrine,

231. Id. at 430.
232. Id. at 430–34. See generally Barclay D. Beery, From Aspiration to Arrogance and
Back: The Once and Future Role of “Equal Employment Opportunity” Under Title VII, 34 VAL.
U. L. REV. 435, 464–70 (2000).
233. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–31.
234. See Xerces, supra note 32; Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a “PostRacial” World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 854 (2011) (“[D]iscrimination remains a deep part of
our nation’s present, whether displayed through educational disparities, home mortgages, loans,
voting patterns, racial profiling, or Supreme Court decisions, there is little question that we have
not yet moved beyond race.”); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 197, 201 (2004) (“More specifically, during Jim Crow and slavery, whites constructed the
institutional rules of the game to favor whites, and the game now continues to reproduce that
advantage.”).
235. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contingent Equal Protection: Reaching for Equality after Ricci
and Pics, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 397, 399 (2010) (quoting Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le,
The Post-Parents Involved Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1015, 1016 n.3 (2008)).
236. Powell, supra note 9, at 844 n.100.
237. Id. at 858–59.
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would effectively forbid states or the federal government from adopting
policies designed to reduce segregation and structural race inequality. Two
years after Parents Involved, Justice Scalia played out this line of reasoning in
his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano, where he argued that the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
238
unconstitutional.

The Court has not formally declared that under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VII race should never be considered to eradicate structural inequality, but
it is getting quite close to doing so. This is why the central meaning of Griggs
should be restored in the Court’s Title VII jurisprudence.
In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII prohibits not only intentional
employment discrimination (disparate treatment), but also disparate impact
discrimination:
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
....
. . . The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
239
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.

The Griggs Court explicitly rejected neutrality and its underlying myths,
and instead focused on eradicating the present day effects of past
discrimination.240 Griggs is a paradigmatic example of the structural
inequality theory—discrimination is embedded in systemic functions that
operate to preserve the status quo of inequality—and it seeks to dismantle the
enduring features of caste-based oppression.241 This is beyond the narrow
view of discriminatory intent with an identifiable perpetrator.
Concluding that a high school completion requirement and a general
intelligence test operated disproportionately to exclude African-Americans
from higher paying positions at the plant, the Court held that there was no
relationship between job performance and the exclusionary job
requirements.242 Lack of discriminatory intent is not the touchstone; rather

238. Hendricks, supra note 235, at 400 (footnotes omitted). While the Court ostensibly did
not resolve the issue of whether the same standards apply under Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause, the point here is that the Court is eager to transplant formalistic notions of
equality into its post-racial jurisprudence so that a finding of discriminatory intent is a statutory or
constitutional requirement.
239. 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (emphasis added).
240. Powell, supra note 9, at 831–59.
241. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26.
242. Id. at 431.
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“Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.”243 Deferring to the legislative expertise
of Congress in defining discrimination in the employment marketplace, the
Court took a skeptical view toward job tests244 and acknowledged the present
day effects of past discrimination: “The objective of Congress in the enactment
of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”245
Significantly, the Court draws upon the history of racial segregation in
schools and notes that this past invidious practice has a present day effect—
African-Americans have long performed poorly in disproportionate numbers
on standardized tests.246 “This consequence would appear to be directly
traceable to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to
manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are Negroes,
petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools and this
Court expressly recognized these differences . . . .”247 There is an intrinsic
unfairness in the process that the Court identifies as statutorily cognizable; in
this instance, “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in
headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.”248
Relying upon the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(hereinafter “EEOC”) interpretive guidelines, the Court gives “great
deference” to the Commission’s job relatedness standard.249 The Court closely
scrutinized all of the neutral rationales for the tests and diploma requirements
and rejected them because they “were adopted . . . without meaningful study of
their relationship to job-performance ability.”250 The non-scientific, anecdotal

243. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
244. See id. at 433–34.
245. Id. at 429–30.
246. Id. at 430.
247. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
248. Id. at 432.
249. Id. at 433–36. These guidelines interpreted Section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 433.
250. Id. at 431. The same is no less true in Ricci, but the Court privileges the reverse
discrimination narrative of the white firefighters. See Selmi, supra note 234, at 854 (critiquing
the rhetorical devices of “hard-working whites” and “complaining” blacks—”In Ricci, the Court
privileged the hard work and desert of the white firefighters over the demonstrated flaws of the
examinations and the importance of diversity within the department.”); see also infra Section
III.A.2–5.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

296

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:255

representations of the vice president of the company were rejected based upon
the real world consequences of the employment practices.251
With all of its promise as an expansive articulation of the structural
inequality theory, there is a tension in Griggs that will be exploited in Justice
Kennedy’s Ricci opinion some twenty-eight years later—the tension between
equality of opportunity (process) and results.252 In Griggs, the Court defined
disparate impact through the analytical prism of disparate treatment liability;253
the Court stated that “[w]e do not suggest that either the District Court or the
Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer’s intent.”254 Thus,
discriminatory intent was the appropriate starting point for determining
whether there was a Title VII violation, yet the Court also articulated the
notion that, absent such discriminatory intent, there could still be a cognizable
statutory claim if testing mechanisms “operate[d] as ‘built-in headwinds’ for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”255 This creates
an “either/or” proposition in the eradication of systemic discrimination. In
other words, while intentional discrimination is an evil that must be eradicated,
there may be neutral explanations for persistent disparities that do not result
from intentional discrimination.256
For example, the Court stated that “[w]hat is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification.”257 This passage contains both language of
process (“the removal of . . . barriers to employment” so that the process is
open to all) and results (the barriers must be removed because they are present

251. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–33 (“Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has
mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.”). By
contrast, the Court in Ricci totally embraces “meritocracy,” as its guiding principle and erects the
strong basis in evidence standard as an evidentiary barrier to disparate impact claims. See Harris
& West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 76. The promotion tests are presumptively valid so the only
“discrimination” is the displacement of the white (and one Latino) test takers who were entitled to
promotions based upon their test scores. See Nicole J. DeSario, Note, Reconceptualizing
Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
479, 507–10 (2003).
252. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674–77 (2009).
253. See Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 228
(1990).
254. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see also Belton, supra note 253, at 228.
255. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
256. See generally Beery, supra note 232, at 465–72 (critiquing the doctrinal limitations of
the concept of disparate treatment under Title VII).
257. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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day manifestations of invidious discrimination, which is a type of intentional
discrimination).258 As Professor Robert Belton explains:
Endorsing both theories of discrimination [disparate impact and disparate
treatment], however, created a theoretical and practical tension. While an
equal achievement theory of equality underlies disparate impact, a
contradictory view of equality underlies disparate treatment—equal treatment.
These two theories of equality and their doctrinal manifestations necessarily
conflict because they have different objectives. The equal treatment/disparate
treatment model is process oriented; it aims to eliminate race and sex from the
employer’s decision making process, and thus to establish strict race and sex
neutrality. Conversely, the equal achievement/disparate impact model is
results oriented; it seeks to improve the economic position of minorities and
women by redistributing more desirable jobs to them. This requires employers
to consider race and sex in their decisions. In addition, while equal treatment
paradigmatically focuses on individuals, equal achievement focuses on
groups—in particular their economic and social status—and legitimates groupbased relief. The tension between these two theories is inevitable because civil
rights laws cannot as a matter of policy—and employers cannot as a matter of
259
practice—simultaneously ignore and consider race and sex.

Professor Belton highlights the classic tension between equal process and
equal results.260 In its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
embraced the seminal proposition that the Constitution protects individuals,
not racial groups.261 Applying a literal and formalistic conception of equality,
rooted in the anti-differentiation principle, the Court has consistently advanced
liberal individualism and neutrality.262 Race is viewed skeptically263 and can
only be used to eradicate the persistent vestiges of discrimination in two
narrow instances: to promote diversity in higher education264 and to remedy
clearly identifiable discrimination by a discriminatory perpetrator.265 All other
forms of discrimination are either “de facto” or “amorphous” and cannot be
remedied by the use of race.266 It is obvious, then, that intent is the touchstone
of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. From Milliken to Davis
to Parents Involved, the absence of discriminatory intent proved fatal to race-

258. See id.; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
259. Belton, supra note 253, at 228–29 (some emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
260. See also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235,
238 (1971).
261. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
262. Powell, supra note 9, at 831–59.
263. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223.
264. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–33 (2003).
265. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989).
266. Id. at 496–98.
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conscious remedial approaches or to complaints alleging discrimination.267
Impact becomes irrelevant unless it can be connected to some form of intent.
In similar fashion, the Court in Ricci has made impact irrelevant without
some form of intent—a “strong basis in evidence” that an employer would be
subject to a disparate impact suit.268 So, in order to engage in “discrimination”
(or to adopt a race-conscious approach), there must be a strong basis in
evidence that the only way to avoid disparate impact liability is to burden the
individualized interests of whites. This is the essence of the theoretical and
practical tension that Professor Belton cogently describes: race must be
ignored in the name of neutrality, but when there is any burden on white
privilege, the Court is breathtakingly race-conscious.269 The Court adopts the
process-based, equal treatment/disparate treatment270 model that focuses on
individuals and access to the process, not guaranteed racial results for an
historically excluded group. Race should be eliminated from the process so
that it is neutral and fair; thus, there must be something more than disparate
impact to prompt a voluntary race-conscious remedy from an employer.271
Intent has become the analytical touchstone of the Court’s Title VII
jurisprudence as well.
The tension between equal opportunity (liberal individualism) and equal
results (group-based equality) remained unresolved for nearly eighteen years
with the Griggs disparate impact standard serving as the basis for Title VII
litigation.272 All of this changed in 1989, when the Court attempted to limit the
scope of disparate impact liability in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio273:
In 1989, a bare majority of the Supreme Court, including Justice Kennedy
(author of the Ricci majority opinion), attempted to limit disparate-impact
liability but was reversed by Congress in 1991. In Wards Cove Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Atonio, the Court made it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to
prove disparate impact by diluting the “business necessity” defense into a
question of “whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer . . . . [T]here is no requirement
that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s

267. See supra Section II.
268. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675–77 (2009).
269. See Flagg, supra note 142, at 1006.
270. Essentially, this is another articulation of the anti-differentiation principle that similarly
situated individuals should be treated the same without reference to race, context, or the
continuing effects of past discrimination. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 79, at 340–41.
271. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
272. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1518 (2004); William B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court
and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64
TUL. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (1990).
273. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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business.” Yet Congress effectively reversed the Court when it passed the
1991 Civil Rights Act, which explicitly stated that its purpose was “to codify
the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . and in other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio” and “to confirm
statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of
disparate-impact suits under Title VII.” To that end, Congress codified the
“disparate impact” component of Title VII by adding language that Title VII is
violated if an employer “uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race . . . and the respondent [employer] fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.” In applying the disparateimpact provision, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
has promulgated the “four-fifths rule,” under which an employment practice
that results in a “selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths (or 80%) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
274
adverse impact.”

By 1989, the Court was well on its way, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
to constitutionalizing colorblindness, it decided City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., and for the first time, explicitly stated that race-conscious
remedial approaches were unconstitutional in the absence of identifiable
discrimination by the state itself.275 So while the Court was actively engaged
in trying to gut Griggs, it was simultaneously creating the colorblind
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that it would import into Title VII. The
Roberts Court goes even farther and adopts a post-racial approach—”[t]he way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race”276—and very nearly unifies both Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is no doctrinal coincidence that when faced with the choice between
substantive equality277 and process-based outcomes, the Court always chooses
process.278 Even with the doctrinal tension between equal opportunity

274. Appling, supra note 226, at 149–50 (footnotes omitted). There was a clear Title VII
violation in Ricci—there was demonstrable adverse impact that fell squarely within the EEOC
guidelines—and the examinations could not be characterized as job-related and consistent with
business necessity because they simply replicated the existing system of exclusion so that no
African-Americans could be successful. Id. at 158; see infra Section
III.A.4.
275. 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) (noting that states may take race-conscious remedial action,
but “they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity” before doing
so).
276. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
277. See Powell, supra note 12, at 846–74.
278. See Powell, supra note 9, at 826 n.15, 852–53.
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(process) and results in Griggs discussed above,279 it still represents a rejection
of neutrality and process-based outcomes that embrace procedural access over
substantive results. Thus, it is imperative that the Court reaffirm the following
thematic concepts in its jurisprudence:
1) Voluntary race-conscious remedial efforts should be presumptively valid,
particularly in contexts where there is a clearly identifiable history of
280
discrimination with present day effects;
2) Disparate impact on historically excluded groups should not be
rationalized as a neutral outcome; and, reverse discrimination claims
should be viewed skeptically because they may serve to preserve the status
281
quo of structural inequality;
3) Discriminatory intent, whether under the Fourteenth Amendment or Title
282
VII, should not be the touchstone for analysis of discrimination claims;
and
4) The Court should defer to the interpretive guidelines proffered by the
EEOC and the institutional competence of Congress to define
283
discrimination.

Of course, the Court ignored all of these doctrinal propositions, creating
instead, out of whole cloth, a new post-racial interpretation of Title VII.284
Ricci rejects the structural view of racial inequality, and instead offers a neutral
rationale for the exclusion of African-American firefighters from the officer
ranks,285 it inverts the disparate treatment and impact standards under Title VII
so that intentional discrimination is the prerequisite for any actions under the
statute,286 it crafts a novel evidentiary standard that presumes the validity of
reverse discrimination claims,287 and, finally, it employs racial politics to reach

279. See supra notes 252–71 and accompanying text.
280. See Roithmayr, supra note 234, at 257–58 (advancing the lock-in model of
discrimination which rejects neutrality and instead takes a comprehensive view of the present day
effects of past discrimination in political systems, education, housing, and economics).
281. See id. at 205 (noting how the “individual intent” view of racism is flawed because it
overlooks the structural aspects of inequality such as the “central role of institutions in
transmitting th[e] cumulative disadvantage”).
282. See id. at 201–13.
283. See infra Section III.B.
284. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–76 (2009).
285. See id. at 2674–76.
286. Under this inverted reasoning, disparate impact claims are transformed into disparate
treatment (reverse discrimination) claims in the absence of a strong basis in evidence “that, had
[the employer] not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute.”
Id. at 2664. Nothing in the decision gives any clue as to how this exercise in doctrinal and
evidentiary prognostication will work.
287. See id. at 2676.
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the conclusion that the process is flawed because race was the predominant
factor in decision-making.288
2. “Neutral Facts” and Race
“In 2003, 118 New Haven[, Connecticut (hereinafter “City”)] firefighters
took examinations to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or
captain.”289 By City charter, a merit system was established, which provided
that vacancies in civil service jobs be filled by the most qualified individuals as
determined by examinations.290 “[T]he New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB)
certifies a ranked list of applicants who passed the test.”291 The charter’s “rule
of three” provided that “the relevant hiring authority must fill each vacancy by
choosing one candidate from the top three scorers on the list.”292 Applicants
for lieutenant and captain positions were screened through a written exam and
an oral exam, which represented sixty percent and forty percent of the total
score, respectively.293
The passage rate for the lieutenant and captains examinations showed stark
racial disparities for African-American and Latino candidates:
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination—43 whites,
19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed—25 whites, 6
blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight lieutenant positions were vacant at the time of
the examination. As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10
candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were
white. Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black candidates to
be considered for promotion to lieutenant.
Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination—25 whites, 8
blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed—16 whites, 3 blacks,
and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain positions were vacant at the time of the
examination. Under the rule of three, 9 candidates were eligible for an
294
immediate promotion to captain—7 whites and 2 Hispanics.

This meant that while a very small number of African-American or Latino
firefighters actually passed the examination, no African-American and only
two Latino firefighters were eligible for promotion under the rules.295

288. See id. at 2681.
289. Id. at 2664.
290. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. The City hired Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. (hereinafter “IOS”) to
develop the promotional exam. Id. at 2665–66.
294. Id. at 2666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
295. Id.; see also Appling, supra note 226, at 150 (“There were even greater disparities
among those eligible under City policy for promotion based on these results: of the nineteen
people who were eligible for promotion to lieutenant or captain, seventeen were white, while only
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Faced with this racially based adverse impact and the possibility of liability
under Title VII and after conducting five hearings involving stakeholders from
the designer of the test to the firefighters and community leaders, the CSB
voted not to certify the results of the examinations, and no one was
promoted.296 Seventeen white firefighters and one Latino who were eligible
for promotion, upon passing the examination, brought suit against the City in
federal court.297 They alleged that the failure to certify the test results violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and the disparate-treatment
provision of Title VII.298
Relying upon well-settled Second Circuit precedent, the district court
granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and concluded that the City’s
“motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially
disparate impact . . . does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory
intent” under Title VII.299 Significantly, the district court stated that “it would
contravene the remedial purpose of Title VII if an employer were required to
await a lawsuit before voluntarily implementing measures with less
discriminatory impact.”300 Thus, voluntary compliance with Title VII was
consistent with its statutory mandate, particularly when a prima facie case of
disparate impact had been established on the record of this case.301 “[T]he
intent to remedy the disparate impact of [the tests] is not equivalent to an intent
to discriminate against non-minority applicants.”302
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,303 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari,304 accepting Judge Cabranes’ invitation to
re-examine the scope of race conscious remedies under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VII.305 From the very beginning of the Court’s recitation of
the underlying facts of Ricci, it is obvious that the post-racial result is a
foregone conclusion.

two were Hispanic and none were black, even though blacks and Hispanics comprised more than
42% of those who took the promotion test.”).
296. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2667–71.
297. Id. at 2671.
298. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (2006)).
299. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006). The district court also
held that there was no Equal Protection violation. Id. at 161 (“Here, all applicants took the same
test, and the result was the same for all because the test results were discarded and nobody was
promoted. This does not amount to a facial classification based on race.”).
300. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 158–59.
302. Id. at 162 (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999)).
303. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
304. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2009).
305. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc); see also Appling, supra note 226, at 152.
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Several neutral rhetorical moves lead to the Court’s holding: (i) the case is
fashioned as a “contest” for goods with two competing parties: one with the
presumption of “merit” and entitlement because they passed the examination,
and those who benefitted only because race was used to skew the process; (ii)
Griggs is literally written out of the case as governing precedent; (iii) the Court
begins with the premise that the City discriminated against the white
firefighters because the failure to certify the examination results was based on
race; and (iv) disparate impact liability is trivialized so that the racial
disparities between white, Black, and Latino test takers are irrelevant in the
absence of additional proof beyond the EEOC guidelines.306 Finally, the Court
substantially alters Title VII jurisprudence by inverting the analytical
principles underlying disparate impact liability and creating a Fourteenth
Amendment-derived evidentiary standard (“strong basis in evidence”) that will
only serve to confuse employers and chill voluntary compliance efforts in the
future.307
Ricci is an acontextual and ahistorical decision: the Court’s analysis does
not acknowledge, in any way, the present day effects of past discrimination.308
The Court goes through the facts of the five CSB meetings in great detail in
order to emphasize how the process was flawed because it trammeled the
individual interests of white firefighters who were entitled to promotions based
on their test scores.309 Liberal individualism is codified and group-based
statutory claims based on race take a backseat to Frank Ricci’s reverse
discrimination claim.310 Indeed, the Court privileges Mr. Ricci’s narrative over
the City’s good-faith efforts to avoid disparate impact liability.311
Discrimination is “define[ed] . . . so narrowly that whites become the new
‘discrete and insular minorit[y]’ (systemic oppression against AfricanAmericans and people of color is so amorphous that it cannot be specifically
identified (or remedied), and individualized reverse discrimination claims are
presumptively valid).”312 Without any reference to history, Rhetorical

306. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–81 (2009).
307. See Appling, supra note 226, at 157–59 (discussing how the Court’s decision in Ricci
might impact decisions made by employers).
308. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]t is against
[a] backdrop of entrenched inequality that the promotion process at issue in this litigation should
be assessed” (emphasis added)).
309. Id. at 2664–72 (majority opinion).
310. See id. at 2667–70.
311. See id. at 2667; Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 118 (discussing how the issue
was framed as whites as racial victims notwithstanding the fact that there was no “injury” because
no one was promoted).
312. Powell, supra note 9, at 858 (emphasis added).
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Neutrality313 is particularly appealing as a doctrinal tool because it provides a
rationale for how disparate impact can be ignored.
The Court constructs a neutral factual narrative of basic “fairness”: the
white firefighters, “at considerable personal and financial cost,” simply
outperformed the minority candidates; the process worked well until race
infected it; and the City took the side of those who did not perform well based
solely on complaints about a “statistical racial disparity” that could be
explained as the objective outcome of a job-related examination.314 “In the end
the City took the side of those who protested the test results. It threw out the
examinations.”315 To the Court, the City chose the “wrong side” because its
decision was not neutral.316
In much the same way as the Court ignored history and context under the
Fourteenth Amendment in order to adopt a literal and formalistic interpretation
of the anti-differentiation principle,317 here the Court codifies the antidifferentiation principle.
Similarly situated white firefighters were
discriminated against on the basis of race. The process guarantees equal
opportunity, not equal results318—this would certainly be true if the process
was free from the lingering effects of past discrimination:
In the early 1970’s, African-Americans and Hispanics composed 30 percent of
New Haven’s population, but only 3.6 percent of the City’s 502 firefighters.
The racial disparity in the officer ranks was even more pronounced: “[O]f the
107 officers in the Department only one was black, and he held the lowest rank
above private.”
....
. . . New Haven’s population includes a greater proportion of minorities today
than it did in the 1970’s: Nearly 40 percent of the City’s residents are AfricanAmerican and more than 20 percent are Hispanic. Among entry-level
firefighters, minorities are still underrepresented, but not starkly so. As of
2003, African-Americans and Hispanics constituted 30 percent and 16 percent
of the City’s firefighters, respectively. In supervisory positions, however,

313. See id. at 831–59 for a discussion of “Rhetorical Neutrality.”
314. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
315. Id.
316. Id. The court concluded that:
[R]ace-based action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the
employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it
would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute. . . . [T]he City’s action in
discarding the tests was a violation of Title VII.
Id.
317. See Powell, supra note 7, at 227–29, 242–43.
318. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674 (“[O]ur decision must be consistent with the important purpose
of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where race is not a
barrier to opportunity.”).
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significant disparities remain. Overall, the senior officer ranks (captain and
higher) are nine percent African-American and nine percent Hispanic. Only
319
one of the Department’s 21 fire captains is African-American.

So, it is obvious that white firefighters and African-American firefighters did
not start at the same place in the process. Next, the Court finds a neutral
rationale to explain the cavernous disparity between white and AfricanAmerican test takers.320 To do so, the Court offers a novel reinterpretation of
Griggs.321
Only two years before Ricci, the Court radically reinterpreted Brown v.
Board of Education to stand for the proposition that individual reverse
discrimination claims take precedence over voluntary community attempts to
maintain integrated schools in the spirit of the anti-subjugation and anti-caste
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.322 Since race is “neutral,” any
decision based upon race is inherently unconstitutional.323 Likewise, under
Title VII, the Court concludes that “[w]hatever the City’s ultimate aim—
however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed—the City made
its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results
solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.”324 The Court inverts
the central premise of Griggs: ostensibly neutral practices, procedures, or tests
may nevertheless “operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory
practices.”325 “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”326 As the quoted language
above illustrates, the Court shifts the analytical focus from the consequences of

319. Id. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
320. Id. at 2678–81 (majority opinion).
321. Id. at 2672–73.
322. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (“Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean
they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications
should be subject to less exacting scrutiny.”). Even Justice Kennedy did not join this section of
the Court’s decision. Id. at 782–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). But see id. at 803–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Powell, supra note 118, at 386–421
(discussing the true meaning of Brown as the eradication of caste-based oppression).
323. Parents Involved, 551 U.S at 743–48 (plurality opinion).
324. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. It is no small irony that the post-racial, orginalist Court is
selective in its recognition of race. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW
INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 30–41 (1996) (discussing how white privilege
has undermined the efficacy of Title VII); SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE
THOMAS AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES 31 (2002) (critiquing
constitutional originalism and noting its analytical failure because it must make racial
distinctions while claiming to ignore such distinctions).
325. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
326. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
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employment practices to the “discriminatory” intent of the City327—there must
be a “lawful justification for its race-based action.”328 The Court takes this
doctrinal leap by ignoring a long line of established Title VII precedent that
permits voluntary compliance efforts to avoid disparate impact liability.329
Once this core Title VII theme is dismantled by the Court, it goes on to
construct a new presumption that radically modifies disparate impact
liability.330
Any use of race is presumptively a statutory violation unless there is a
lawful justification for its use.331 The Court’s analysis does not even begin
from a point of deference to the City’s good faith attempt to avoid disparate
impact liability, the EEOC guidelines that clearly define the disparity here as a
statutory violation, or Congress’ legislative purpose of removing the present
day (“neutral”) effects of past discrimination.332 Instead, the Court all but
determines the result of this case by starting with the premise that “[t]he City’s
actions would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent
some valid defense.”333
In much the same manner that the Court focuses on the discriminatory
perpetrator through intent in its equal protection jurisprudence, Ricci’s
approach, under Title VII, emphasizes discriminatory intent so that the
African-American firefighters’ legitimate claim of disparate impact is
subsumed under the premise that the only statutorily valid claim is that of the
white firefighters.334 The white firefighters become “victims” of their own
performance on the examination: “[T]he City rejected the test results because
‘too many whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists
to be certified.’”335 The City’s voluntary attempt to comply with Title VII
becomes intentional discrimination. Impact, whether under the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title VII, is constitutionally or statutorily irrelevant in the
absence of something more.336

327. Specifically, if the purportedly neutral testing system is left intact, “entrenched
inequality” will continue to operate to exclude African-American firefighters from the officer
ranks. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra
note 27, at 133–57 (proving that the lieutenant and captain examinations violated the EEOC’s
4/5ths rule and that the tests were unfair to people of color and whites).
328. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
329. See id. at 2701–02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 2676 (majority opinion).
331. Id. at 2673.
332. See id. at 2699–2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 2673 (majority opinion).
334. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
335. Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006)).
336. Id. at 2673–74.
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The Roberts Court’s post-racial jurisprudence is based on the central theme
that, even if there are significant disproportionalities between people of color
and whites, actionable discrimination must be based on clearly identifiable
intent. This narrow doctrinal rationale unifies the Court’s affirmative action,337
school desegregation (integration),338 and, most recently, Title VII decisions.
Ricci is an extraordinary decision because it acknowledges the existence of a
significant adverse impact which establishes “a prima facie case of disparateimpact liability,” but nevertheless concludes that this “significant statistical
disparity” is meaningless (or natural) in the absence of some additional proof
of liability339:
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact
liability—essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity
and nothing more—is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would
340
have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.

The Court reaches this conclusion by inverting disparate treatment and impact
with a contrived tension that distorts the meaning of Title VII, and by creating
a new strong basis in evidence standard.
3. The Inversion of Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy attempts to chart a “middle”
doctrinal course between what he views as the absolutist arguments advanced
by the firefighter petitioners and the City.341 He dismisses, as “overly
simplistic and too restrictive of Title VII’s purpose,” the petitioners’ argument
that “an employer in fact must be in violation of the disparate-impact provision
before it can use compliance as a defense in a disparate-treatment suit.”342
Referencing “Congress’s intent that ‘voluntary compliance’ be ‘the preferred
means of achieving the objectives of Title VII,’” Justice Kennedy expresses
concern that a requirement of certainty of a disparate impact violation “would
bring compliance efforts to a near standstill.”343
Justice Kennedy is equally adept at rejecting the City’s argument that its
good-faith attempt to avoid disparate impact liability permits it to use raceconscious remedies. Concluding that the 1991 amendment to Title VII
contained no good faith exception for race-based compliance efforts under the
disparate impact provision, Justice Kennedy posits that “[a]llowing employers

337. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
338. See supra Section II.
339. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
340. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
341. Id. at 2674.
342. Id..
343. Id. (quoting Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515
(1986)).
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to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition based on a mere good-faith fear
of disparate-impact liability would encourage race-based action at the slightest
hint of disparate impact.”344 This would lead to an exclusive focus on statistics
with employers adopting a racial quota system designed to avoid even the
“slightest hint of disparate impact.”345
What is really telling about Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the arguments
advanced by the parties is that he embraces the core value of Title VII—
voluntary compliance—while simultaneously rejecting such compliance as
statutorily prohibited, race-based decision-making in violation of the disparate
treatment provision.346 This is because the Court’s analysis starts with the
premise that the City violated the disparate treatment prohibition of Title VII:
The white firefighters were discriminated against because of their race when
the CSB failed to certify the results of the examinations due to the
overwhelming disparate impact on the African-American firefighters.347 The
Court itself acknowledges that this is a case where there is prima facie
evidence of disparate-impact liability.348 The pass rate for Black [31.6 percent]
and Latino [20 percent] candidates “[fell] well below the 80-percent standard
set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.”349
Based on rankings and the “rule of three,” if the examination had been
certified, no African-American candidates could have been considered for
promotion.350 Finally, the disparity here is directly connected to an ostensibly
neutral procedure which freezes the exclusionary practices of the past.351 Yet,
this was insufficient for the Court.
Discarding the EEOC’s 80-perecent standard, the Court constructed a new
standard that shifts the focus from voluntary compliance to discriminatory
intent.352 Employers will be presumed to have discriminated in violation of the
disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII “absent some valid defense.”353 It
is insignificant whether the employer was trying to avoid disparate impact
344. Id. at 2675.
345. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675.
346. Id. at 2673–2676.
347. Id. at 2673.
348. Id. at 2677–78.
349. Id. at 2678.
350. Id. at 2665.
351. The Court itself in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886), Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252. 269 (1977), held that there could be statistical disparities so stark that they
could only be explained by reference to an invidious purpose based on race. Impact is
determinative in these rare instances, and the history surrounding the adoption of an ostensibly
neutral policy with disparate impact on African-Americans is relevant. There is no such analysis
in Ricci. 129 S. Ct. at 2676–77.
352. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677–78.
353. Id. at 2673.
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liability if its decision was based on race, there must be a “strong basis in
evidence” to support it.354 This means that even a prima facie case of disparate
impact is insufficient because this “threshold showing of a significant
disparity” does not meet the newly minted “strong basis in evidence”
standard.355
Justice Kennedy fabricates a “tension” between the two Title VII
provisions—disparate treatment and disparate impact—and then “resolves” it
by transplanting Fourteenth Amendment colorblind principles into Title VII
jurisprudence.356 But these colorblind principles take on an even narrower
gloss. While the use of race is narrowly cabined to particularized
discrimination or diversity under the Fourteenth Amendment, such use is
presumptively forbidden here because disparate impact on the AfricanAmerican firefighters is a natural part of the process.357 Thus, an employer
cannot “guarantee” race-based results through disparate treatment of the white
firefighters.358 Eschewing the voluntary compliance mandate of Title VII, the
Court viewed the City of New Haven’s suspension of the test results to avoid
disparate impact liability as disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.359
“Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking
violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take adverse employment
actions because of an individual’s race.”360 The “other” justification is the
strong basis in evidence standard.
4. The “Strong Basis in Evidence” Standard: A New Evidentiary
Presumption?
By creating “intra-statutory discord,”361 Justice Kennedy sets up an
either/or choice between the presumption that the City has violated the
disparate treatment prohibition of Title VII and the validity of disparate impact
liability.362 To “reconcile” this contrived conflict, Justice Kennedy looks to the

354. Id. at 2675.
355. Id. at 2678 (emphasis added).
356. Id. at 2674 (“We consider, therefore, whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact
liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination. Courts
often confront cases in which statutes and principles point in different directions.”). But see id. at
2699–2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Neither Congress’ enactments nor this Court’s Title VII
precedents (including the now-discredited decision in Wards Cove) offer even a hint of “conflict”
between an employer’s obligations under the statute’s disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions.”).
357. Id. at 2674 (majority opinion).
358. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 2673.
361. Id. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 2681 (majority opinion).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

310

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:255

Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.363 Analytically, the Fourteenth
Amendment decisions cited to support the newly transplanted “strong basis in
evidence” standard are all reverse discrimination cases where the Court
ignored the present day effects of past discrimination to preserve the
The Court’s equal
entitlement interests of non-minority plaintiffs.364
protection decisions are perfect conduits for the Court’s post-racial
jurisprudence: Since it is “impossible” for the Court to distinguish between
invidious racial discrimination and good faith efforts to eradicate caste-based
discrimination, the strong basis in evidence standard is essential to “smoke
out” impermissible employment decisions.365 “The Court has held that certain
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are
themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong
basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary.”366
The strong basis in evidence standard purportedly resolved the tension,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, between invidious discrimination and racebased government decision-making—there must be evidentiary support for
race-conscious remedies.367 This support is “crucial when the remedial

363. See id.; id. at 2675 (majority opinion).
364. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2701 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). While Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
distinguishes Wygant and Croson as cases involving “absolute racial preferences,” id., these
decisions are properly understood as voluntary efforts to eradicate the present day effects of past
discrimination in the employment marketplace. It is not only appropriate, but necessary to use
race-conscious remedies in this context. By contrast, the Court has been selective in how it
applies the discriminatory intent requirement under the Equal Protection Clause: “[W]here the
disparate impact is on innocent whites, the Court is willing to assume that there is some
underlying discriminatory purpose.” Powell, supra note 7, at 242. Likewise, under the Court’s
novel interpretation of disparate impact under Title VII, it is presumed that there is a disparate
treatment violation because the burden is on the innocent white firefighters. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at
2673. Disparate impact, like societal discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot be
remedied unless there is some evidence of discriminatory intent. Here, that would mean that
there must be “a strong basis in evidence that the test was deficient and that discarding the results
is necessary to avoid violating the disparate-impact provision.” Id. at 2676. Obviously, this
standard has a built-in evidentiary protection for the white firefighters—promotion tests will
rarely, if ever, be deemed deficient and discarding test results based on race will be held to be
disparate treatment discrimination. This is analogous to the compelling state interest test under
the Fourteenth Amendment which is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” See James E. Fleming,
“There is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2308–09 (2006). Professor Gerald
Gunther created this phrase to underscore the inevitability of strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 2308;
Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 77 (1995).
365. Spann, supra note 364, at 89 n.420; Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
366. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675 (majority opinion) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
367. Id. at 2677.
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program is challenged in court by nonminority employees.”368 The process
must be open, and racial outcomes cannot be guaranteed.369 Extrapolating this
rationale into its Title VII jurisprudence, the Court concludes that:
The same interests are at work in the interplay between the disparatetreatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII. Congress has imposed
liability on employers for unintentional discrimination in order to rid the
workplace of “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”
But it has also prohibited employers from taking adverse employment actions
370
“because of” race.

Thus, one form of “discrimination” (discarding the flawed test and starting
over to avoid disparate impact liability) should not be excused in the name of
voluntary compliance. Without a strong basis in evidence, the government’s
action is nothing more than disparate treatment discrimination.371 Stating that
process values, equal opportunity, and access should be the touchstone of an
employer’s efforts in the employment marketplace, the Court concludes that
the expectation interests of the white firefighters should not be disturbed on the
basis of race,372 racial preferences are prohibited, and “before an employer can
engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or
remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it
fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”373 This italicized
passage illustrates the inversion of disparate impact and disparate treatment.
Voluntary compliance to avoid disparate impact liability is transformed into
intentional discrimination; the present day effects of past discrimination
evinced in the status quo of exclusion of African-Americans from the
firefighting officer ranks is “unintentional disparate impact” (there is no
identifiable discriminatory perpetrator who is responsible for this neutral

368. Id. at 2675 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
369. Id. at 2677.
370. Id. at 2675–76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
371. Id. at 2676 (emphasizing the neutral quality of employment tests and concluding that
“the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the City in sole reliance upon race-based
statistics”).
372. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2677; see William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government
Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2, 18–29 (2011) (noting that since there was no formal unequal
treatment or racial subordination in Ricci, the Court constructs a novel “injury” of expressive
harm in reverse discrimination suits). Contra Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating the white firefighters “had no vested right to promotion. Nor have other persons received
promotions in preference to them”).
373. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (emphasis added).
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disparity); and the strong basis in evidence standard serves as an evidentiary
device for the employer, who acts in good faith, to “convict” itself.374
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, and, now under Title VII, unintentional
discrimination is little more than circumstantial evidence.375 In a classic
neutral rhetorical move of inversion, disparate impact must be established on
the very terms that define disparate treatment liability. Essentially, an intent
requirement now serves as an analytical bridge between the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VII. While the Court notes that it did not address the
constitutionality of the measures taken to comply with Title VII, this issue is
all but decided when the Court adopts the strong basis in evidence standard.376
It is unclear how the strong basis in evidence standard will work. There
are a number of concerns here: (i) when will it be appropriate to presume
discriminatory intent on the part of an employer when it acts pursuant to the
voluntary mandate of compliance under Title VII, (ii) how are burdens of proof
assigned under the strong basis in evidence standard, and (iii) what quantum of
proof is sufficient to establish “a strong basis in evidence to believe” that an
employer will be subject to disparate impact liability? All of these doctrinal
queries point to the conceptual incompleteness of the Court’s decision—there
is no analytical framework for establishing when a disparity is transformed
from a mere “threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity”377 to a
remediable disparity under Title VII.
Moreover, the Court never defines what a “strong basis in evidence” is: an
inference (a permissive fact that may be accepted or not as conclusive proof of
an asserted proposition),378 a presumption (conclusive proof unless rebutted
with counterproof),379 or simply a reference to the quality of proof needed to
establish a strong basis in evidence?380 Based on the outcome in Ricci, it
appears that the latter definition is the most accurate denotation. The City is
presumed to have engaged in intentional discrimination against the white
firefighters, it must proffer a justification for such discrimination, and the
justification must be supported by a strong basis in evidence that the City
would be liable for disparate impact discrimination because “the examinations

374. See id. at 2701 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (critiquing the strong basis in evidence standard
and noting that “[i]t is hard to see how these requirements differ from demanding that an
employer establish ‘a provable, actual violation’ against itself”).
375. See id. at 2677 (majority opinion).
376. Id. at 2676.
377. Id. at 2678.
378. See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 112–13
(3d ed. 2003).
379. See generally id. at 109–13.
380. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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were not job related and consistent with business necessity.”381 This is a
narrower view of race than even that espoused in Parents Involved.
Ironically, Justice Kennedy is open to the use of race in limited
circumstances in the context of school integration.382 In fact, his concurrence
in Parents Involved is quite explicit in its rejection of the plurality’s absolutist
post-racial approach.383 Endorsing a diversity interest in integrated schools,
Justice Kennedy notes that race could be used in a “general way” to ensure that
equal education opportunity was available to all.384 The key is that race
conscious remedies can be used in a neutral way.385 Race can be used as one
of many factors to ensure that the process is open to all.386 Parents Involved
does not appear anywhere in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in
Ricci.387
While the Court borrows liberally from its rigid Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, it does not embrace a diversity interest in the public service
employment marketplace.388 Perhaps this is because the issue in Ricci is not
the process—every eligible firefighter can take the promotion examination; the
issue is whether the City used race to reach a certain result.389 The decision to
decertify the test results and trammel the individual interests of the white
firefighters is precisely such an impermissible race-based decision. To the
Court, this is a disparate treatment violation; the white firefighters are
penalized based on their success on a neutral examination.390 Racial decisionmaking is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII—Parents
Involved and Ricci are linked doctrinally through this proposition.391 What is
telling about this line of reasoning is that the disparate impact on the AfricanAmerican firefighters is virtually ignored; more specifically, the
“discriminatory” impact on the white firefighters must be justified as job
related and necessary or appropriate in the absence of suitable alternatives.392
This leads to the most troubling aspect of the strong basis in evidence
standard: In analyzing reverse discrimination claims, once it is presumed that
381. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
382. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–90
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
383. Id. at 788 (“The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the
Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.
I cannot endorse that conclusion.”).
384. Id. at 788–89.
385. Id. at 790.
386. Id. at 789.
387. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
388. See id. at 2681.
389. Id. at 2664.
390. Id. at 2678–81.
391. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 719; Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
392. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
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an employer has intentionally discriminated, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for an employer to meet this test.393 To make matters worse, the
strong basis in evidence standard serves to reinforce the Court’s initial
analytical premise that “[t]he City’s actions would violate the disparatetreatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.”394 As Ricci
graphically illustrates, a valid defense will be difficult to articulate as the Court
discounts disparate impact and instead presumes that neutrality means that
there is no statutorily cognizable discrimination.395 Rather, if there is any
cognizable discrimination, it is the claims of the displaced white firefighters
that will resonate.396 This is antithetical to Griggs and its doctrinal progeny,
the 1991 amendment to Title VII, and to the statutory goal of voluntary
compliance.
a. Job Relatedness and Business Necessity
There is a disturbing inevitability about the Court’s decision in Ricci:
starting from the premise that the City engaged in disparate treatment
discrimination, the Court constructs a new standard that serves to buttress
reverse discrimination claims while neutralizing the valid claims of historically
oppressed groups. The Court gives little more than cursory treatment to
whether the examinations were job related and consistent with business
necessity.397 Of course, not much analysis is required after the Court starts
with its disparate treatment premise, imports a heightened standard of review
from the Fourteenth Amendment, and concludes that “there is no strong basis
in evidence to establish that the test was deficient” in job relatedness and
business necessity or the existence of a less-discriminatory alternative.398
The Court misconstrues the job relatedness and business necessity
standard. The Court in Griggs, deferring to the legislative intent of Congress,
concludes that there are two distinct discriminatory practices proscribed by
Title VII— overt discrimination and “practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”399 Significantly, in
1971, when Griggs was decided, the concern was with the present day effects
of past discrimination—neutral systems should be viewed skeptically because

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 2701–02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
Id. at 2673 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2675–76.
See id. at 2678.
See id. at 2678–79.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

HARVESTING NEW CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY

315

they could replicate the effects of the recently dismantled formalized system of
discrimination.400
The same is no less true today: When a neutral “employment practice
which operates to exclude [African-American firefighters] cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”401 Since the practice
is statutorily prohibited, employers are free to avoid disparate impact liability
by taking measures to voluntarily comply with Title VII.402 Voluntary
compliance, where an employer throws out a flawed evaluative mechanism
because it freezes the status quo of exclusion,403 cannot be equated to disparate
treatment discrimination. “Here, Title VII’s disparate-treatment and disparateimpact proscriptions must be read as complementary.”404
There is no doctrinal trace of Griggs in the Court’s analysis of jobrelatedness and business necessity.405 Instead, basing its conclusion on the
anecdotal and subjective statements of several witnesses,406 the Court
concludes that “[t]here is no genuine dispute that the examinations were jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.”407 Without critically assessing
the design and format of the examination, the Court summarily rejects the
City’s assertions that the examinations were not job-related and consistent with
business necessity.408 The Court’s bare analysis consisted of crediting the
statements of Chad Legel, an IOS409 vice president, about the meticulous detail
IOS used in developing and administering the examinations, one outside
witness, with firefighting experience, who had reviewed the examinations and
concluded that the “questions were relevant for both exams,” and a competing
test designer who “stated that the exams ‘appea[r] to be . . . reasonably
good.’”410 Legitimate claims that the examinations were not job related were
categorically dismissed by the Court, relying on Legel’s statement that IOS
“reviewed those challenges and provided feedback” to the City.411 The Court’s
process-based analysis merely rubberstamps the reverse discrimination claim
400. Id. at 430.
401. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
402. Id. at 2701–02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that voluntary compliance is “the
preferred means of achieving [Title VII’s] objectives” (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986))).
403. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
404. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
405. See, e.g., id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In arriving at its order, the Court barely
acknowledges the pathmarking decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.” (citation omitted)); see
also id. at 2675–78 (majority opinion).
406. Id. at 2668–79.
407. Id. at 2678.
408. Id. at 2677–79, 2681.
409. See supra note 293.
410. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678–79 (citation omitted).
411. Id. at 2679.
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of the white firefighters. It is astonishing that the Court based its landmark
holding on such a thin reed.412 Another scholar characterized the decision as
follows:
In a characteristically arrogant tone, the Court proclaimed the test to be
valid . . . . The Court boldly made this assertion even though no evidence
regarding the test’s validity had been submitted in the various proceedings.
Not only was no evidence presented, but the Court was almost certainly wrong
413
in finding it valid.

Indeed, as many scholars have concluded, the design flaws alone in the
promotion examinations are sufficient to support the conclusion that the
examinations were not job related and consistent with business necessity.414
Several flaws have been identified: (i) the test did not evaluate the practical
aspects of the job of lieutenant and captain in the fire department;415 (ii) the
60-40, written (multiple choice) to oral weighting of the examination is
arbitrary;416 (iii) rank order promotions based on combined, differently
weighted examination scores may lead to the exclusion of candidates of
color;417 and (iv) “the arbitrary designation of the passing score as seventy.”418
These core measurement flaws are described by Professors Harris and WestFaulcon:
[T[here were critical omissions of steps central to ensuring that the tests at
issue adequately measured the candidates’ ability to perform the jobs in
question. First, . . . IOS failed to identify “leadership skills” and “command
presence” as knowledge, skills, and abilities that supervisory fire officers must
possess to perform well on the job, and thus, no component of the 2003
promotional exams even attempted to assess candidates’ abilities with regard
to these job-critical skills. Second, the City never asked—nor did the test
designer consider—whether, as compared to a 100-question multiple-choice
test and a standardized oral interview test, alternative methods . . . could better
measure the qualities of a fire officer. Third, the relative weighting of the

412. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 143 (“Without any acknowledgement of the
central role that the testimony of professional employment testing experts, professional testing
standards, and the Uniform Guidelines [of the EEOC] have typically played in Title VII disparate
impact lawsuits, the Ricci majority essentially presumed the scientific validity of the 2003 exam
results because the test designer had made efforts at facial fairness—involving minorities in the
test design process and scrubbing test questions of visible racial discrimination or undertones.
This racing of test fairness replaced the stronger scientific and substantive professional standards
that should be applied when tests have skewed results.” (footnote omitted)).
413. Selmi, supra note 234, at 850 (footnote omitted).
414. See, e.g., Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 143.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 135, 143, 152 (noting that white firefighters have a claim for unfair testing as
well).
417. Id. at 143.
418. Id.
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multiple-choice and oral parts of the exam as 60 percent and 40 percent
respectively, was based not on any objective determination of the numerical
score that reflected minimum competence but, instead, was arbitrarily set
419
based on the union-negotiated agreement.

The disparate impact in Ricci is directly traceable to the flawed tests used to
evaluate the firefighters.420
b. Alternative Means
In equally cursory fashion, the Court concludes that there is no strong basis
in evidence that the City refused to adopt “an equally valid, less-discriminatory
alternative” than the promotion examinations.421 Noting that the 60/40 writtenoral weighting of the examination was required by the City’s contract with the
firefighters union and that changing the weighting to 70/30 could violate Title
VII’s prohibition against racially altering test results, the Court held that a
70/30 weighting was not an equally valid alternative.422 The Court adopted the
same rationale to reject the argument that “a different interpretation of the ‘rule
of three’ . . . would have produced less discriminatory results.”423 Finally, the
Court dismissed statements by Christopher Hornick, an organizational
psychologist and competitor of IOS, that an assessment center process which
evaluates candidates’ performance in specific job tasks, “would have
demonstrated less adverse impact.”424 To the Court, this was merely one of a
few “stray (and contradictory) statements” made by Hornick who was more
interested in “marketing his services for the future” than in critically analyzing
the examination and any valid alternatives.425
Again, it is the presumption of validity that guides the Court’s analysis—
there are no valid, less discriminatory alternatives because the test measured
“merit,” and the City cannot racially alter the results to ensure representation of
African-American firefighters.426 To do so would create a racial quota in

419. Id. at 126–27 (footnotes omitted); accord Selmi, supra note 234, at 850–51 (“[M]ultiplechoice tests often reward test-taking skills, which have little to nothing to do with leadership in a
fire department.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2703 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
420. Selmi, supra note 234, at 846 (“[T]he City sought to create an inexpensive written
examination with the hope that the results would not be discriminatory even though the test it
purchased was precisely the kind of examination that has historically had the greatest disparate
impact.”).
421. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678, 2679–81.
422. Id. at 2679. But see id. at 2703 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 2679 (majority opinion).
424. Id. at 2680–81 (emphasis added).
425. Id. at 2680.
426. Id. at 2678–79, 2681; see also Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 157–59.
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violation of Title VII (and the Equal Protection Clause).427 As Professors
Harris and West-Faulcon note:
Ironically, Ricci’s failure to apply Title VII’s requirements regarding test
validation actually enacts a presumption that white overrepresentation is the
natural product of merit selection; Title IV’s requirement that employers
justify a racially skewed status quo, even in the pursuit of a fair test that
actually measures job performance, is portrayed as making nonwhites “the
428
special favorite[s] of the law.”

The Court’s blind deference to the uncritical assessments cited in its
opinion causes it to ignore a much broader context—promotion tests like the
one at issue in Ricci have been uniformly criticized, and there is a move away
from such tests as evaluative tools.429 The true irony here is that the City chose
the very type of examination that perpetuates systemic disparities—the same
disparities it would seek to avoid by not certifying the disproportionate
examination results.430 The fact that there were a range of less discriminatory,
viable alternatives underscores the fact that the City would be subject to
disparate impact liability, not that it discriminated against the white
firefighters.431 Indeed, if the Court is truly concerned about inequality, it
should analyze whether the test is unfair to all test takers.432 A reverse
discrimination claim should not trump a city’s good faith efforts to avoid
disparate impact liability under Title VII. This is why voluntary compliance is
central to the statutory purpose of Title VII—formal discriminatory barriers
may have receded, but ostensibly neutral practices may preserve the enduring
features of past discrimination.433

427. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664–65. This is another doctrinal strand of the Court’s importation
of Fourteenth Amendment rationales into its Title VII jurisprudence. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726–33 (2007) (plurality opinion) (holding
school integration plans of Seattle and Louisville unconstitutional and stating that “[w]e have
many times over reaffirmed that ‘[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake’” (quoting
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992))).
428. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 157 (emphasis added) (quoting The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
429. See Selmi, supra note 234, at 850–51; Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 144–57.
430. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
431. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 154–57.
432. Id. at 133–35.
433. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432–36 (1970) (stating that tests must be
job-related to prevent the use of purportedly neutral tests that perpetuate systemic inequality).
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c. Rejection of Voluntary Compliance Efforts
Neutrality is central to the Court’s formalistic conception of equality.434
Thus, in Parents Involved, the Court construes the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit “racial balancing” in the schools so that any resegregation is
natural.435 There is a bright line distinction between de jure (state action) and
de facto discrimination.436 Likewise, under Title VII, since there has been “no
discrimination”
against
the
African-American
firefighters,
their
disproportionate failure rate on the examination is natural, and any attempt to
avoid this result is statutorily prohibited racial balancing (disparate treatment
discrimination).437 Under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII, the
Court is acutely attuned to preserving an individual right to a racially neutral
process—there is a personal interest to attend neighborhood schools438 and
there is a personal interest to rely on the results of the firefighters
examination.439 “Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s reliance
on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and
qualified for promotions.”440
It is difficult to discern where the Fourteenth Amendment ends and Title
VII begins—it is almost as if Davis has crystallized in the strong basis in
evidence standard. There can be no voluntary, race-conscious efforts to
remedy the present day effects of past discrimination in the absence of intent.
Under Title VII, this means that there must be “a strong basis in evidence to
believe [that the City] would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the
examination results.”441 Of course, in the context of a reverse discrimination
claim, it will be very difficult to proffer this strong basis in evidence. From the
outset of the Ricci opinion, it is obvious that the City made the wrong
choice.442 The Court concludes that the City should have sided with the white
firefighters.443 Specifically, an employer should resolve the manufactured
434. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection
Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1083–88 (2011) (arguing for rejection of the rigid, tiered
approach to equal protection analysis and the intent requirement, and advancing a theory of
substantive equality).
435. 551 U.S. 701, 736 (2007) (plurality opinion); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Integrating
into a Burning House: Race- and Identity-Conscious Visions in Brown’s Inner City, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 541, 564–66, 573–81 (2011) (reviewing MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES
OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK (2010)) (discussing the rhetoric of choice, liberal
individualism, and the legacy of Brown).
436. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 736 (plurality opinion).
437. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675, 2677 (2009).
438. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion).
439. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
440. Id. (emphasis added).
441. Id.
442. Id. at 2664.
443. Id.
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doctrinal “conflict” between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions by rejecting the statutory objective of voluntary compliance:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then
in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid
disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment
444
liability.

So, an employer should certify disproportionate test results based on the
“hope” that, with a reverse discrimination suit looming on the horizon, it made
the right choice to avoid disparate treatment liability.445 This circularity is
astounding because it privileges reverse discrimination (disparate treatment)
claims over disparate impact claims. The claims of the white firefighters are
more important than those of the African-American firefighters because the
Court concludes that the process is tainted by racial decision-making.446
Obviously, a strong basis in evidence is whatever the Court says it is. This
is the only explanation for the result in Ricci: Nearly every relevant conceptual
or factual element of the case is distorted, neutralized, or ignored.447 The
Court’s sole concern is the reverse discrimination claim and how such
“intentional” discrimination by the City can be justified.448 Of course, under
the Court’s post-racial analysis, any justification will be viewed skeptically and
generally rejected. This is particularly true when the Court invokes the racial
politics rationale.
5. Racial Politics: Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Purportedly to correct the dissent’s factual “omissions,” Justice Alito
advances a racial narrative reminiscent of the stereotypical devices employed
during the Reconstruction Era.449 There is an interesting rhetorical twist to
Justice Alito’s modern day racial narrative: African-Americans are not
ignorant, lazy, dishonest, or extravagant, they are simply too powerful

444. Id. at 2681.
445. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
446. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 121.
447. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2702–10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
448. Powell, supra note 9, at 859–62; 865–62.
449. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Caleb A. Jaffe, Obligations
Impaired: Justice Jonathan Jasper Wright and the Failure of Reconstruction in South Carolina, 8
MICH. J. RACE & L. 471, 473–78 (2003) (discussing historical stereotypes of African-American
Reconstruction legislators as lazy, ignorant, and incompetent, and the progressive scholarship
aimed at dismantling these bogus claims); accord W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA 711–12 (1992); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863–1877 xx–xxi (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988);
Powell, supra note 7, at 218–19.
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politically, and this led to racially skewed results in the process.450 Title VII
and the Fourteenth Amendment protect an open and neutral process, not racebased results. Justice O’Connor employed an identical rhetorical device in
Croson.451
Justice Alito cites very little case law in his concurrence; rather, he elicits
stock characters in a racial narrative constructed on the premise that the City’s
attempt to avoid disparate impact liability was “pretextual.”452 Indeed, “the
City’s real reason was illegitimate, namely, the desire to placate a politically
important racial constituency.”453 The most prominent member of this racial
constituency was Reverend Boise Kimber who was described as a “powerful
New Haven pastor and self-professed ‘kingmaker’ who “call[ed] whites racist”
and had previously “threatened a race riot during a murder trial.”454 Justice
Alito portrays Reverend Kimber as a skilled practitioner of racial politics and
powerful political player who was selected to chair the Board of Fire
Commissioners “despite the fact that he had no experience” because he was an
“invaluable political asset.”455
Justice Alito goes on to recount how Reverend Kimber dominated the
process with his demands that the test be discarded because of its disparate
impact on the African-American firefighters.456 The City, through the Mayor,
simply wanted to please Rev. Kimber and his constituents.457 So much so that
Justice Alito reasoned that the process was tainted because the Mayor had the
ultimate authority to “overrule a CSB decision accepting the test results.”458
The Mayor did not exercise this power because the CSB concluded that the test
results should not be certified.459 However, since the Mayor intentionally
chose not to exercise his corollary power to overrule the CSB’s decision
rejecting the test results, this proved “that the City’s asserted justification [to
avoid disparate impact liability] was pretextual.”460 Again, in resolving the
“tension” between potential disparate impact and disparate treatment claims,
the City made the wrong choice. It chose the racial claims of a group over the

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 84, 136.
See Powell, supra note 9, at 865–68.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683–84 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2684 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2685–86.
Id. at 2687.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 2687.
Id. at 2689.
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individualized claims of Frank Ricci and Benjamin Vargas.461
individualism has been codified in Ricci.

Liberal

6. Parents Involved and Ricci: Comparative Notes
Ricci fits squarely within the jurisprudential canon of Fourteenth
Amendment Rhetorical Neutrality: the history of racial discrimination in the
firefighting ranks is ignored; disparate impact is redefined so that any impact
on white interests (or privilege) is a violation of Title VII; and neutral rhetoric
is employed to explain the present day effects of past discrimination as natural,
rational, and inevitable.462 The only reason that the African-American
firefighters failed in disproportionate numbers is that they did not study hard
enough—the white firefighters cannot be displaced by a race-conscious
remedial approach designed to equalize results.463 Ricci reads like a
Fourteenth Amendment decision rather than a Title VII decision.464
Discrimination has been redefined again in the Court’s race jurisprudence.465
Parents Involved and Ricci rely exclusively on affirmative action decisions to
erect a seminal, post-racial principle466: “The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”467

461. It is quite interesting that the Court privileges the individualized narratives of a white
firefighter (Ricci) and a Latino firefighter (Vargas) over the claims of a group that has been
historically discriminated against and excluded to this day in the firefighting profession. See
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing the personal sacrifices of Ricci and
Vargas); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 74–85.
462. Powell, supra note 9, at 831–59.
463. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring).
464. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 112–13.
465. Id. at 116–17.
466. Id.
467. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
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The chart below illustrates how the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
overlap doctrinally to form the Court’s post-racial jurisprudence:
Post-Racialism Conceptual Themes Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
Fourteenth Amendment:

Title VII:

Parents Involved
1. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
discriminatory state action.
2. Discriminatory impact, in the absence of
identifiable discriminatory intent, is
insufficient to establish a claim under the
468
Fourteenth Amendment.
There must be
a strong basis in evidence to adopt a race469
conscious remedy.
3. The de jure-de facto distinction in school
cases sets the parameters of
constitutionally cognizable violations:
Intentional discrimination is actionable,
while de facto discrimination cannot be
remedied by employing race-conscious
470
remedies.
4. The mandate of Brown is a prohibition
against race-based decision-making by the
state. The Fourteenth Amendment protects
neutral process (opportunity), not equal
results. A school board cannot use race to
maintain integration in the schools. The
Constitution protects individuals, not racial
471
groups.
5. Voluntary remedial efforts will be
overturned in the interest of individual
rights. So, the fact that a school system
needs to use race, as one of many factors,
to achieve and maintain integration will be
ignored to advance the interest of
472
individual school choice.

Ricci
1. Title VII prohibits discrimination in the
workplace by public or private employers.
2. While there may be significant evidence of
disparate impact, this is insufficient to prevail
473
Where there is no
on a Title VII claim.
strong basis in evidence to believe that the
employer would be subject to disparate impact
liability, an employer cannot engage in
“intentional” discrimination to avoid
474
“unintentional” disparate impact.
3. The “tension” between disparate treatment and
disparate impact liability must be resolved so
that a good faith attempt to avoid disparate
impact liability does not result in disparate
475
treatment discrimination against whites.
4. Ricci stands for the proposition that race-based
decision-making by an employer is prohibited
because every individual is entitled to
476
participate in an open and fair process.
Title VII protects equal opportunity, not racebased results: “[O]nce that process has been
established and employers have made clear
their selection criteria [even if that criteria has
a disparate impact on Blacks], they may not
invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an
employee’s legitimate expectation not to be
477
judged on the basis of race.”
5. Disparate impact on people of color will be
tolerated to avoid displacing the individual
478
rights of whites.

468. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 434, at 1080–83.
469. Id. at 1080–83.
470. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 749–50, 756–57 (Thomas, J. concurring).
471. Id. at 746–48 (plurality opinion).
472. See id. at 745, 748 (overturning voluntary remedial efforts to integrate in interest of
individual rights of white parents); Spann, supra note 23, at 596–617.
473. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The Ebb and Flow of Race
Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 37 (2009).
474. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
475. Id. at 2675–77.
476. Id. at 2677, 2681.
477. Id. at 2677.
478. Spann, supra note 37, at 1147.
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It is no coincidence that virtually all of the Court’s race jurisprudence is
based on reverse discrimination suits. Therefore, the seminal issue in these
cases is how any burden on white privilege can be explained, accounted for, or
justified. This is the hallmark of Justice O’Connor’s race decisions for the
Court.479 The Roberts Court goes even farther. The propositions referenced
above serve to rationalize the continuing effects of past discrimination (or
structural inequality). Parents Involved and Ricci are the Roberts Court’s
explicit articulations of a post-racial theory: “The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”480 Thus,
anything that remotely benefits people of color is viewed as presumptively
invalid because the “neutral” process has been skewed to produce a racial
result. Racial balancing, whether to preserve integrated schools or to ensure
inclusion in the historically segregated officer ranks of the fire department, is
constitutionally infirm and statutorily prohibited.
Conversely, the claims of reverse discrimination claimants are
presumptively valid because the Court starts with the proposition, under either
the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII, that there is an actionable
discrimination claim due to the burden on white interests. The inversion is
complete under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII—the anti-caste
principle is transformed into a literal anti-differentiation principle, and
disparate impact is redefined to include intent as an element of proof—and
whites are now the injured party.481 Their individualized claims trump the
claims of subjugated racial groups. This approach should be rejected, and
instead the Court should embrace the true substantive core of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII.
B.

An Argument for Substantive Symmetry

Ricci is a provocative decision because it decides so much without
explicitly doing so. While its holding did not address the constitutionality of
measures designed to comply with Title VII or whether the newly minted
strong basis in evidence standard “would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in
a future case,”482 Ricci nevertheless synthesizes the Roberts Court’s post-racial
jurisprudence.
In Ricci, the Court is audacious in its exercise of unrestrained judicial
power: it ignores the very EEOC guidelines that serve as a baseline for
establishing potential disparate impact liability,483 it casually discards its own

479. Powell, supra note 9, at 859–73.
480. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
481. Powell, supra note 7, at 199–220.
482. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
483. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 135–42.
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precedent which acknowledged voluntary efforts by employers to avoid
disparate impact liability,484 and it substitutes its own judgment for that of
Congress by “rewriting” the 1991 Amendment to Title VII and “overruling,” to
some extent, Griggs v. Duke Power and resuscitating the discredited reasoning
of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.485
1. The Section 5 Power and Substantive Equality
It is not an exaggeration to state that Ricci “overrules” Congress’ 1991
Amendment to Title VII;486 at the very least, it substantially modifies how
disparate impact discrimination will be defined. This is a doctrinal attack on
Congress’ Section 5 power.487 The Rehnquist Court ushered in the New
Federalism,488 and now the Roberts Court has gone even farther in promoting
post-racial federalism.
Rather than attempting to limit the reach of
congressional power under the doctrines of congruence and proportionality, the
Roberts Court reinterprets the boundaries of institutional power by radically
altering its own precedent so that it directly contradicts the legislative purpose
of Congress.489 While the Court has never fully conceptualized how Title VII
and the Fourteenth Amendment overlap doctrinally to permit race-conscious
remedial efforts, the Court has noted previously that “Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause are the same for the purpose of analyzing voluntary raceconscious remedial measures implemented by public employers.”490 This
meant that the Court subscribed to a narrow symmetry between Title VII and
the Equal Protection Clause—there is an intent-based justification for disparate

484. See id. at 116–18.
485. Id. at 113–18.
486. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105. Stat. 1071, 1071 (“The
purposes of this Act are— . . . (2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job related”
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio; (3) to confirm statutory authority and
provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.); and (4) to respond to recent decisions of
the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” (citations omitted)). Ricci directly undermines
the legislative purpose of the 1991 Amendment: the “strong basis in evidence” standard supplants
the concepts of “business necessity” and “job relatedness.” See supra Section III.A.4.a.
487. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
488. See Randy Lee, The New Federalism: Discerning Truth in American Myths and
Legends, 12 WIDENER L.J. 537, 539–43 (2003); see also Cedric Merlin Powell, The Scope of
National Power and the Centrality of Religion, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 702–16 (2000).
489. Powell, supra note 488, at 711–12.
490. Powell, supra note 12, at 930 (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency 480 U.S, 616, 649
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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impact liability.491 This justification should be rejected because it does not
address, in any form or fashion, structural inequality.492
Equal opportunity means dismantling not only formal barriers to access,
but the persistent and current obstacles that are directly traceable to past
discrimination. Under this definition, reverse discrimination claims should be
rejected.493 Advancing a moral theory of disparate impact, Rebecca Giltner
argues that Congress’ Section 5 power should be exercised to “maximize[] the
aspiration of equal citizenship.”494 Equal citizenship includes the right to
participate meaningfully and substantively in every aspect of the American
polity; education and employment are integral to equal citizenship.
Congress has more than simply a remedial or preventive power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it has the power to legislate for the
Nation and this means that some interpretation of the Constitution is
essential.495 “The assumption that the Court has always been the primary
interpreter of the Constitution is simply not true.”496
In order to restore the meaning and doctrinal power of Griggs:
Congress should employ its powers, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to clarify the reach of Title VII—that is, employers, private and
public, should be allowed to adopt race-conscious (and gender-conscious)
remedies in response to societal or identifiable discrimination that results in a
manifest imbalance in the workplace. There would be symmetry between the
Court’s equal protection and Title VII jurisprudence, and there would be
congruence between the Court’s powers and those of Congress. The Court
would not cramp the power of states to adopt race-conscious remedies, nor
would it prohibit Congress from exercising the positive grant of legislative
power rooted in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Congress
could amend Title VII to include a more flexible conception of race. Congress
could make clear that race can be a positive factor in Title VII cases, and that
497
colorblindness is not the touchstone of Title VII analysis.

491. See Rebecca Giltner, Note, Justifying the Disparate Impact Standard Under a Theory of
Equal Citizenship, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 427, 434–35 (2005).
492. See id. at 437 (discussing how “a strict intentionality approach” privileges claims of
those who have not been historically oppressed and impedes access to people of color).
493. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that white firefighters “had no vested right to promotion”).
494. Giltner, supra note 491, at 460.
495. See id. at 458–60; Powell, supra note 12, at 931–32.
496. Giltner, supra note 491, at 458. Indeed, it is precisely in situations where the Court
renders ill-conceived decisions like Ricci when Congress’ Section 5 power is most important.
497. Powell, supra note 12, at 931–32 (footnote omitted).
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This approach “acknowledges the existence of societal discrimination and
seeks to incorporate such an analysis into the Court’s constitutional and
statutory jurisprudence.”498
2. The Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
Formalistic definitions of discrimination, including the rigid intent
requirement, should be rejected and replaced with a comprehensive, structural
interpretation of inequality. A substantive-symmetrical approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII would provide a doctrinal framework
that moves away from intent as a conceptual absolute. “Substantive” refers to
an approach that critically assesses process—neutrality is viewed with
skepticism.499 “Symmetry” means that the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII are complementary and should be interpreted to guarantee substantive
equality.500 Good faith, voluntary efforts to include those who have been
historically excluded in the employment marketplace should be viewed
favorably:
The substantive-symmetrical approach provides a ready response to these
doctrinal problems [the Court’s attempt to reconcile “the degree to which
principles establishing an employer’s liability under Title VII and the equal
protection clause overlap”]. Just as Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
should not be read to cramp voluntary race-conscious remedial efforts by the
state, and the Court’s notion of congruence, as articulated in Adarand, should
not be read to limit federal power to enact race-conscious remedies pursuant to
its Section 5 powers, the Court should not limit the same voluntary remedial
efforts by a public employer under Title VII. Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment both embrace an antidiscrimination principle that prohibits racial
subordination through the maintenance of a caste system. Where public
entities voluntarily embrace this principle, their efforts should be accorded
501
substantial deference.

This would bring the Court in line with the EEOC guidelines, its own
precedent, and principles of institutional competence. The importance of
acknowledging that racism is adaptable and that structural inequalities adjust to
changing times is illustrated by a recent decision by the Court.502

498.
499.
500.
501.
502.

Id. at 930.
Id.
Id. at 931–32.
Id. at 929–30 (footnote omitted).
See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2010).
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3. Structural Inequality: Lewis v. Chicago
While Lewis v. Chicago addresses the timeliness of a charge with the
EEOC as a prerequisite to a federal lawsuit under Title VII, it offers some
doctrinal clues to the Court’s conception of discrimination.503 In a unanimous
decision by Justice Scalia, the Court concluded that the petitioners, who were
African-American firefighters, could assert a timely disparate impact claim
where they challenged the City of Chicago’s later application of an
employment practice rather than after its initial adoption.504 The City’s
“ongoing reliance” on a cut off score of eighty-nine or higher, which excluded
qualified African-American candidates who otherwise passed the examination,
constituted a “continuing violation of Title VII.”505 While the City conceded
that there was a disparate impact on African-American applicants, it
nevertheless argued that they “had failed to file EEOC charges [as required
under Title VII] within 300 days after their claims accrued.”506 Rejecting the
City’s procedural argument that the claims were time-barred because there was
no challenge to its initial unlawful decision (and no violation occurred
thereafter), the Court concluded that “[i]f petitioners could prove that the City
‘use[d]’ the ‘practice’ that ‘causes a disparate impact,’ they could prevail.”507
“[A] Title VII plaintiff must show a ‘present violation’ within the limitations
period,”508 and the petitioners did so because “their allegations, based on the
City’s actual implementation of its policy, stated a cognizable claim.”509 The
Court noted a clear difference between disparate treatment claims, which
required evidence of discriminatory intent, and disparate impact claims, which
have no such requirement.510
While Lewis may lead to some confusion in assessing an employer’s
potential liability under Title VII’s disparate impact provision, particularly in
light of the undefined “strong basis in evidence” standard in Ricci,511 there are
some noteworthy aspects of the decision. First, the Court noted that disparate
impact claims are distinct and do not require discriminatory intent—this seems

503. See id. at 2197.
504. Id. at 2195.
505. Id. at 2196 (internal quotations omitted).
506. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (2006)).
507. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2198–99.
508. Id. at 2199 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)).
509. Id. at 2198.
510. Id. at 2199.
511. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 27, at 161–62 (“Lewis effectively expands the
window within which an employer might be liable for disparate impact even as Ricci raised the
bar for employers who might seek to avoid disparate impact liability by ceasing to rely on racially
or gender skewed tests. Ricci thus tends to compel employers to use tests that produce racially
disparate impact, while Lewis suggests that each time it does, it will be subject to yet another
lawsuit.”).
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to be a clearer articulation of what disparate impact is under Title VII. There is
no merging of the intent requirement as in Ricci.512 There is no “conflict”
between the disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions in Title VII.513
Of course, Lewis may be an “easier” case than Ricci; here, the City of Chicago
conceded that its actions were unlawful, and there was no reverse
discrimination suit by “displaced” white firefighters.514 So, no “choice” had to
be made between “intentional” discrimination to avoid liability based on an
“unintentional” disparate impact unsupported by a strong basis in evidence.
Also, the Court did not address the quantum of proof required to meet the
strong basis in evidence standard in Ricci.515
Second, the Court, at least on a superficial level, acknowledges the
systemic and structural nature of discrimination—the conclusion that the
African-American firefighters’ claims are not time-barred is based on the fact
that the City’s practice continued over time (not simply within the 300 day
pleading period after its initial unlawful decision).516 Thus, there was a
“present violation,” with a disparate impact on the excluded firefighters, within
the limitations period.517 Adopting a deferential approach to Congress’
definition of disparate impact, the Court rejects the City’s contention that it
would be subject to new disparate impact suits “for practices they have used
regularly for years.”518 Essentially, a disparate impact with continuing effects
over the years is statutorily cognizable.519
Most significantly, the Court expressed the need to defer to a co-equal
branch of government’s legislative decision-making power:
Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted. . . . Congress allowed
claims to be brought against an employer who uses a practice that causes
disparate impact, whatever the employer’s motives and whether or not he has
520
employed the same practice in the past.

512. See supra Section III.A.3.
513. See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199.
514. Id. at 2198.
515. Id. (noting that the issue of whether petitioners adequately proved disparate impact
liability was not before the Court).
516. See id. at 2196.
517. Id. at 2199.
518. Id. at 2200.
519. See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200 (“Under the City’s reading, if an employer adopts an
unlawful practice and no timely charge is brought, it can continue using the practice indefinitely,
with impunity, despite ongoing disparate impact.”). In order to reject this reasoning, the Court
implicitly acknowledged the systemic and structural nature of inequality. Id.
520. Id.
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Certainly, this same deference would have been welcomed in Ricci only a year
earlier. “[T]o give effect to the law Congress enacted” would mean restoring
Griggs to the Court’s analysis of Title VII cases.521
A number of conceptual propositions emerge from this discussion:
1) The Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII reinforce each other, and should
be interpreted so that intentional discrimination and the present day impact
of past discrimination are addressed through race-conscious remedies;
2) Voluntary remedial efforts to eradicate structural inequality should be
presumptively valid as they represent the constitutional mandate of the
Fourteenth Amendment (to dismantle caste-based oppression) and the
statutory purpose of Title VII (to remove persistent barriers to substantive
opportunity in the workplace);
3) The intent requirement of Washington v. Davis and the strong basis in
evidence standard should be rejected as intractable obstacles to injured
plaintiffs who have valid racial discrimination claims;
4) Reverse discrimination claims should be viewed skeptically because they
are advanced by individuals who have not been historically discriminated
against and their claims are based upon entitlement (and white privilege)
rather than caste-based oppression;
5) Congress should exercise its power, under Section 5, to clarify the
meaning of disparate impact and to explicitly reject the Fourteenth
Amendment doctrinal gloss added to Title VII by the Court in Ricci; and
6) The Court should defer to the legislative power of Congress whenever it
legislates to end structural inequality in society.

CONCLUSION
Ricci and Parents Involved are much more than decisions about a
firefighter’s promotion examination and integrated schools, these decisions are
seminal doctrinal events in the Roberts Court’s post-racial jurisprudence. The
arguments advanced in this Article are unlikely, at least at the present time, to
change the direction of the Court. There is, however, a much broader,
comprehensive objective here—analysis of the complex issues underlying race
and racism must shift from neutrality to substantive conceptions that advance
race-conscious remedial approaches to eradicate structural inequality in all
segments of American society. This is even more urgent given the recent
report detailing the cataclysmic wealth disparity between whites, AfricanAmericans, and Latino/as.522

521. Id.
522. Rakesh Kochhar, Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs
Between Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 26, 2011), http://pewsocialtrends.
org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/ (discussing
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There is hope, it is important to note that both Ricci and Parents Involved
were voluntary actions by political communities committed to substantive
equality in the most public of spaces—the workplace and schools. Yet, the
Roberts Court went out of its way to overturn both decisions. Certainly, we
cannot place our hopes and aspirations for a new conception of equality in the
hands of an openly hostile Court, we must build from the ground up. We need
to harvest new conceptions of equality: The seeds of substantive equality are
planted firmly in the anti-caste principle of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
statutory mandate of Title VII. We should embrace a new conception of
equality in which opportunity means more than procedural access, results are
rooted in a theory of substantive equality, and neutrality is viewed skeptically
as we actively work toward the eradication of structural inequality.523

median wealth of white households which is twenty times that of African-American
households—$113,149 median net worth of white households compared to $5,677 for AfricanAmerican households).
523. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 260–66 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (citation omitted) (noting the thirty-four year history of discriminatory firefighter hiring
policies with present day disparate impact on African-American firefighters and stating that
“[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect
of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face”).
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